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ABSTRACT
The critical turn in international relations theory that has accelerated particularly in the 
second half of the 1980s has exacerbated the sense of crisis within the field of 
international studies. The main accusation directed to the initiators of this crisis is the 
overemphasis on superfluous metatheoretical issues and lack of due attention to the 
‘substantive’ issues of world politics. This thesis is a discussion paper that counterposes 
these arguments. It tries to offer an overview of the dissenting voices by focusing mainly 
on postmodernism and Critical Theory. Through a theoretical exercise related to security 
studies, that has been directed by the insights of postmodernism, it tries to demonstrate 
the fertility of the metatheoretical ferment.
ÖZET
Özellikle 1980 lerin ikinci yarısında yaygınlaşan eleştirel yaklaşımlar uluslararası ilişkiler 
alanındaki kriz algılamalarını arttırdı. Bu krizin yarıtılmasında asıl pay sahibi olanlara 
yöneltilen başlıca suçlama önemsiz meta-teorik konularla fazlaca meşgul olmaları ve 
dünya politikasının temel meselelerine gerekli ilgiyi göstermemeleridir. Bu tez bu tür 
argümanlara karşı duran bir tartışma yürütmektedir. Ağırlıklı olarak postmodernizm ve 
Eleştirel Teori üzerinde yoğunlaşarak muhalif görüşlerin bir genel görünümünü sunmaya 
çalışmaktadır. Güvenlik çalışmalarıyla ilgili, postmodernist görüşlerden esinlenmiş bir 
teorik egzersiz aracılığıyla meta-teorik arayışların verimliliği ortaya konulmaya 
çalışılmıştır.
This dissertation owes its greatest debt to Assist. Prof. Gulgiin Tuna. Inaddition to her 
encouragement and guidance as my supervisor, I am indebted to her for introducing me 
to international relations theory and particularly the dissenting voices for the first time. 
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PREFACE
This study was initially inspired with a special interest in the question of Eurocentricism 
and its implications both in international relations theory and on the foreign policy 
behavior of developing countries like Turkey. I began with a rereading of Edward Said’s 
“Orientalism” and continued with a review of its critiques. Then I found myself 
proceeding into the heart of a debate in international relations theory in which 
Eurocentricism constitutes one of the central themes. This new debate is quite appealing 
and even striking particularly due to the celebratory rhetoric on the part of the initiators 
of this crisis as opposed to the despair that has been prevailed in the ‘previous crisis’.
Finding one’s way within this debate poses a hazardous task. For a discordant 
chorus of dissident voices (postmodernism, poststructuralism. Postcolonialism, feminism, 
Gramscian Critical Theory, Habermasian Critical Theory, historical structuralism, etc.) is 
further complicated with the too sophisticated jargon of the dissenters and philosophical 
subject matter that is quite alien to an average student of international relations. This 
complexity of the metatheoretical ferment brought forth by the recent debate lead many 
conventional international relations scholars to see the recent debate as an ‘imbroglio’ 
that led nowhere and to caricature the dissenters as confused and confusing intellectuals 
in a Woody Allen film.
The main argument forwarded by the mainstream scholars is that critical 
approaches, although they give a dynamism to the field, caused theoretical confusion and
the critical turn would soon lose its zeal leaving a trace on rationalist approaches that 
could not alter the essence of the preexisting international relations theory. Nevertheless a 
meticulous reading of the critieal literature would reveal that dissenters have a point to 
make and their role can far transcend that of stimulating a review of the conventional 
approaches as against the arguments and wishes of the conventional scholars.
Sympathetic to the critical turn in international relations and assuming a 
postmodernist/poststructuralist vantage point, the main aim of this thesis, is to give a 
brief review of the critical turn in international relations. Thus our aim is to provide the 
reader with a sense of the issues that created resentment in a wide variety of different 
circles and to show that critical approaches could initiate theory construction and could 
yield praiseworthy results. We will eoncentrate mainly on postmodernism and Critical 
Theory in this review.
A frank interest in critical approaches is vital in that they provide ways to opt out 
of the despairing positivist game of becoming a scientific discipline. They could provide 
trajectories for the field that could take studies to a line in accord with that of the broader 
social sciences. Critical approaches could challenge and replace the parochial approaches 
of the international relations scholarship that severe the links between the area and wider 
debates within the social sciences. They could provide more elaborate depictions of 
social reality, for they are putting emphasis on the fact that ‘reality’ that we are dealing is 
the ‘social reality’, and hence historical, constructed and intersubjective. These 
approaches might turn reality into a slippery surface on which proceeding to an Eden of 
true and compleLc knowledge becomes an elusive quest. However, their genuine merit lie 
in the fact that they have a distinguished role in opening up a space to mention normative
questions within this’elusiveness and ehallenge the pessimistic analysis that reiterate the 
hopelessness of positive change. One of these changes that create optimism is the 
intellectual plurality that has prospered by the rise of the critical turn. Eschewing to 
propagate any kind of closure in the name of a new grand theory of international 
relations, our discussion contemplates to project the contributions of this plurality in 
curbing down the isolation of the international relations discipline, in enriching the 
intellectual assets of the field and in coming over its parochial view.
This thesis is composed of two main parts that assume equal significance with 
respect to our aims. The first part might be considered a (meta)theoretical exercise. After 
explicating the present crisis in intcrnaticna! relations in the first chapter, I will dwell on 
po.stmodernism by its major related arguments in the second chapter. The second chapter 
aims to show the intimate relevance of the questions posed by postmodernism to the dead 
hand of the disciplineand particularly its realist core. However, it must be stated that 
critical turn is not limited to the transposition of the postmodernism into the international 
relations field. The second part consisting of the third chapter would be a theoretical 
application of these metatheoretical concerns in the field of security. In the third chapter, 
we would interrogate the rationalist/instrumentalist conception and consequent 
depoliticization of security issues. This chapter aims to procure a more vivid example for 
the contributions of critical approaches in international relations. In the fourth and last 
chapter, a general overview of the contributions made, the questions raised and prospects 
for the field created by the critical turn will be given. This chapter tries to summarize the 
inci iis of a critical approach not only for radical movements but also for the formulation 
of foreign policy both in theoiy and practice.
CHAPTER I: CELEBRATING THE CRISIS 
1.1 Irony of the “Present Crisis” in International Relations Theory
Any student who glances at the literature on contemporary international relations theory 
would find him/herself vociferously greeted by a plethora of depictions of ‘disciplinary 
crisis’ with ensuing explanations or descriptions of it. However, this would seem rather 
anachronistic to a student of international relations, especially to those who have been 
educated in a graduate or undergraduate program in this field. Hence, international 
relations students are familiar to this sense of crisis, at least to a modicum of theoretical 
confusion since the first classes taken in international relations theory or world politics 
courses.
At least once through our education probably we were all intimidated by the long 
list of “doctrines, images of the world, ideologies, paradigms or perspectives” that could 
influence a particular writer’s work*. Courses commence with an enumeration of the 
“alternative images or perspectives of international relations” with their “certain 
assumptions” concerning “critical actors, issues and processes in world politics”. Then 
they continue with a brief description of the certain types of answers, as well as 
questions, and the use of certain methodology in this process rendered necessary by these
' See Paul R. Violli and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Tlieorv- Realism. Pluralism. Globalism. 
(New York: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 1-2. See Michael Banks, “Tire Intor-Paradigm Debate” in Margot Light 
and A  J. R. Groom (eds.), Intemational Relations: a handbook of current theory. (London: Frances Pinter, 
1985) for a review of the literature enhancing paradigmatic debates revolving around realism, structuralism 
and pluralism triangular.
underlying images^. These descriptions were supplemented by brief critiques of each 
perspective. Courses end by lamenting the yet unfulfilled goal of constructing a rigorous 
social science of international relations. Of course laced by the often reiterated excuse of 
the complexity of the subject matter and a wish for the completion of this task even 
though there is no hope seen in the foreseeable future.
To epitomize, constructing a scientific discipline, defined in terms of a rigorous 
positivism, remains as the only way to follow that can not be interrogated and hence it 
was set from the outset that we, the academicians, must fly to this Eden of science like 
flies flying to the light by the aim of reaching True knowledge’ or at least by the aim of 
chasing ‘truer knowledge’^ . I'his eternal and holy (at least venerable) quest for ‘true 
knowledge’, having its own inner logic, is graphically guided by “frames of reference”'*, 
that is “belief systems, which can neither be proven absolutely true or false” .^ 
Nevertheless theories sprung out of these frames must be tested empirically, so a 
hypothesis must consist of a “testable statement of relationship between two or more 
variables” With this requirement of empirical testing, simultaneously scientific research 
is also constrained within the confines of the researchable questions -questions of ‘What 
is?’ related to facts, not ‘What should?’ that is questions related to values. Thus there is 
no way reflecting upon ones’ own “frames of reference” as they are not empirically 
testable. Only in time, these philosophies or belief systems underlying scientific
 ^Viotti and Kauppi, op. cit note 1, p.2-3.
^Gerald R. Adams and J. D. Schwane Weldt, Understanding Research Methods. (New York: Longman, 
1985),p.l2.
' Ibid., p.35. Adam and Sch^vane, use the term “iVamo of references ' similar to world views, paradigms or 
models of man, indicating the philosophies or the set of values and beliefs that effect scientific enterprise 
by helping “to define meaningful research problems and esiahlish criteria for truth" (36) “in subtle but 
important ways”(35).
 ^ Ibid., 41.
''' Ibid.
enterprise could be evaluated according to the performance of their theories, when they 
are tested against utilitarian scales of explaining the world, providing ‘true knowledge’ 
about it and making correct predictions.
When the lamented plight of the discipline and hardships of recovering it from 
this malaise infuse with the constraints o f ‘scientific ideals’ and utilitarian understandings 
of scientific knowledge, students are left with “a take it or leave it” choice in the face of 
weaknesses and inadequacies of each alternative and the tremendous risks of any kind of 
eclecticism. Thus, any student of IR is likely to experience a crisis (at least a personal 
one) at the outset of her/his academic life.
These pessimistic conclusions are reiterated by different writers, even when they 
follow different lines of analysis. Mansbach and Ferguson,^ in their book that I have read 
with a taste of despair as a graduate student, endeavour to explain the plight of the 
international relations discipline by the lack of a paradigm, and thus a foundational 
consensus in the field. They deplore the lack of consensus on the subject matter to be 
studied, the methodology to be utilised, and the criteria to evaluate the acceptability of 
the solutions, that renders the borders of the discipline ambiguous and insecure* *. 
International relations studies proceed in the dearth of any “broadly shared 
conceptualization of the important puzzles or problems to be solved and any adequate 
theory to guide us in the solution of these problems”**. In this respect international 
relations might be seen less than “a true discipline” '** as it “fails to meet the basic 
objective of any science” which is defined in terms of constituting “a body of
’R. W. Mansbach and Y. H. Fergusson, Tlie Elusive Quest: Theory and International Politics. (Cohmibia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1988)
* ibid., pp.22-3.
Ibid., p.23.
theoretically organised knowledge that is based on cumulative empirical research”” . 
Thus, debates within the international relations field resemble neither to the Kuhnian 
scientific progress, that occurs through replacement of one paradigm by another nor to 
the additive or incremental scientific progress suggested by Holsti’^ . In this view 
international relations are seen as an open area that could not be closed off and thus could 
not achieve scientific progress.”  In contrast to the conviction of Adams and Schwane that 
frames of reference (or paradigms) can generate scientific knowledge through the 
utilisation of scientific methods, Mansbach and Ferguson strongly contend that the 
interference of value-laden paradigms hindered scientific progress. They discarded 
realism as a paradigm as “it is less a theory, than a self contained syllogism that closes off 
further analysis and sustains a particular ideology”” . Mansbach and Ferguson concluded 
their analysis by pointing out becoming a true scientific discipline (that was defined in 
completely utilitarian terms in the sense of reaching true and useful knowledge) as the 
unequivocal ideal.
Strikingly, despite the depth of their insights in evaluating realist approaches and 
despite their aptitude in realising the value-laden nature of it, they exonerated ‘scientific 
knowledge’ of any entanglements with power. Instead of interrogating ‘scientific ideals’ 
they incriminated only the enormous complexity of the social reality that makes it
ibid., p.24.
'' Mcgowan and Shapiro cited in Mansbach and Ferguson, p. 213.
’^K. J. Holsti, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Wliich are the Fairest Theories of All?, International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol:33 No:3 (1989), 255-261.
Mansbach and Ferguson employed the concept of “paradigm” in a radically different meaning then it has 
assumed in the article of Lapid or Hoffman. Wiat they call a paradigm is commensurate to an “cmprico 
aiialyiicar conception of theory, i.c., “a conception of tiicory as an abstract device by which to understand 
social realities. For tliis concept of emprico analytical conception of theory see E. Fuat Keyman, 
Globalisation. State, Idcntitv/Differcnce: A Critical Theory of International Relations Tlicorv. (New Jersey: 
Humanities Press, 1996), p.92. This definition, on which Mansbach and Ferguson discarded realism as an 
cnsentblc of values, not a paradigm, comes closer to the conception of paradigm in Lapid as a 
metatheorctical construct.
intractable to empiricism and implicitly invokes the necessity of decisive detachment of 
scientific enterprise from values. By their urge to detach values from scientific enterprise 
they neglect that every statement about world around us is based on a “general mental 
map which shows how the world society is structured and which aspects of it are the most 
significant”*^ . And moreover, Mansbach and Ferguson overlook the fact that this general 
mental map is inevitably value laden.
These arguments, whether optimistic or pessimistic about the present situation of 
the discipline, can be considered as integral parts of the crisis, that we would designate, 
‘yesterday’s crisis’. As there is a ‘reality out there’ to be discovered and it is one and 
only, they all point to the need for a consensus, secure borders, accepted tools for 
attaining objective knowledge and the graphic lack of them. However, they close all the 
ways for self-reflectivity by their positivist/empiricist bias.
1.2. Difference of the Present Crisis: Visibility of Dissonance
Having this much debated plight of the discipline in mind, one cannot help but ask the 
question ‘What is new to be coined “today's crisis” that paved the way for this inflated 
sense of disorder within the field of international studies that is argued to be comparable 
to the subject matter it studied?’. Working in a field that neither seems to have strictly 
defined boundaries, uncontested theories or methodologies nor is likely to have these in 
the foreseeable future, what can the so-called “third debate”, i.e., “third discipline
defining debate” mean? 16
Ibid., p.216.
Banks, op. cit. Note 1, pp.7-8.
'®Tliis is a temi coined by Lapid. Yosef Lapid, “ Tlie Tliird Debate: On the Prospects of Inteniational 
Theory in a Post-Positivist Era”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol:33 No:3, 235-254.
The first point that seems appealing is that these analyses of the present crisis 
involve references both to the past and present state of the discipline that generally 
overlook the prior plight of the field, and the prospects for its future evolution. While 
some writers define explicitly or refer implicitly to a “pre-crisis past”, some base their 
arguments on an illustration of the discipline as a site of ceaseless struggle and unsettled 
bickering. Nevertheless both lines of arguments are underlined by the same 
understanding of evolution, which asserts that despite alterations something remains 
unchanged.
Whereas Lapid argues that the “third debate”, that is preceded by the “ “idealism 
versus realism” schism of the 1920s and 1930s” and the more recent “history versus 
science” exchange of the 1950s and 1960s”*’, flanged open the gates of the discipline for 
“a vigorous plurality by its epistemological relativism”**. On the other hand, Holsti 
asserts that pluralism has always been a characteristic of international relations studies in 
the sense that “at no time has a single paradigm commanded the field as a whole and 
replaced all others, although some have been predominant in various periods”*·*. He 
sketches out six dimensions of international relations theories that are structured as 
dichotomies (like “atomistic anarchy versus community as visions of the world” or 
“pessimism versus optimism about the outcomes of processes”’**. When “any particular 
theorist inhabits the extremes of four or more of these dimensions, a stream of thought
Ibid., p. 236.
Ibid., p. 243.
17 K. J. Holsli, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Wliich are the Fairest Tlieories of All?, Internationa/ Studies 
Quarterly, Vol:33 No:3 (1989), p.258.
Holsti borrowed this classification from Mansbach and Ferguson (1986) and added two more 
dimensions. Whereas Mansbach and Ferguson mention these dimensions as ceaselessly reiterated stale 
positions that served shaping allegedly new postures with only slightly altered jargons, thus as a signifier of 
the inert character of the field, Holsti utilises them as the propitious ground where the progress of Ihe field 
was rooted.
invariably develops to challenge that position” '^. Through this process of ‘revision 
breeding revision’, the study of international relations as a field progresses additively, 
coming closer to a more accurate understanding of the realities of the world by 
recognizing “multiple realities and hence of multiple theories”^^
A similar vision of the field that proceeds cumulatively (or using a more 
appropriate term to the Habermasian orientation of Hoffman, dialectically) is invoked by 
Mark Hoffman^^. International relations, since it was first established as an academic 
discipline in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, Hoffman posits, was 
proceeded through a series of debates and it finally reached a major crossroads, or in 
other words it reached the point of an “interparadigm” debate '^*.
Another description of the flux in international relations field can be found in
James der Derian’s “Antidiplomacy”^^ . Der Derian figures out three main stages -
respectively, realism, neorealism and hyperrealism- through which international relations
studies drifted smoothly and swiftly around a rationalist axis, one following the other.
“In a very short period the field has oscillated from realist theory, in wliich world-historical figures 
mean what they say and say what they mean, and diplomatic historians record it as such in Rankcan 
fashion(“wie es eigentlich gewesen ist”); the neorealist in which politico-economic structures do 
what they do, and wc do what they make us do, at least up until 1989, to hyperrealist , in wliich the 
model of the real becomes more real tlian the reality it models, and we become confused.”"®
What is striking and significant in respect to our concern, in these analyses 
offered by scholars affluent to different and often contrasting intellectual postures, lay 
more in their convergence than their points of departure. All illustrate a relatively
Ibid.
^^ibid.,pp.258-61.
"’Mark Iluffuuui, “Ciilical Tlicory and the Interparadigm Debate”, in Hough C. Dyer and Leon 
Mangasarion (eds.), Tire Study of the International Relations: The State of the Art. (London: Macmillan, 
1989)
Michael Banks cited in Hoffman, p.60.
25 James Der Derian, Antidiplomacv -spies, terror, speed, and war. (Cambridge& O.\ford; Blaclwell, 
1992),
10
peaceful and secure disciplinary terrain prior to the crisis -a territory under the sovereign 
control of the dominant paradigm of realism that gives no lease of life to dissident voices 
and thus manage to survive uncontested. They invoke a natural being that has a natural 
space of life, either which it has ever inhabited or destined to expand out to fill this 
natural space through evolutionary progress. Before present crisis, although the field of 
international relations is characterized by lack of consensus about the right perspective or 
paradigm to be adopted, at least a modicum of unison exists about the stances of the 
antagonists, what are the lines of contention between them. Even though, there are 
countless shades of difference within any single paradigm, one can collapse different 
writers under the rubric of one paradigm without much difficulty. One can sketch out the 
main tenets of realism, neorealsim or world system theorists.
To demonstrate such an imagination of the discipline that awaits in relative 
tranquillity before the present crisis and fissured endlessly by the rise of it, writings of the 
scholars like Holsti or Keohane^^ must be examined meticulously. Although they disguise 
this sense of crisis by their efforts to normalize the dissident voices or rejections as the 
natural process of scientific questioning to reach better understanding of the “realities of 
the world” and claim that there is nothing new in this state of the discipline since plurality 
or evolution by revision is an inherent characteristic of the field, this theme of a pre-crisis 
past is easy to recognize from the highlighted areas of coherent, evolutionary liberated 
zones in the name of realism and its versions, or rationalist approaches. Thus, the 
dominant paradigms of it are also represented as consensual points of view, a unitary 
voice of a consensus, speaking in unison through a single interlocutor, evolving but
26 ·ibid, p.5.
11
consistent in time. In accord with this vision of the discipline, present crisis is conceived 
as the contestation of realism from a number of critical perspectives. Subsequently, these 
challenges are contemplated to pop up all of a sudden in the field of international 
relations, drawing on the currency of critical social theory acquiesced long before in other 
fields or disciplines^*. The critiques of the dominant paradigm are illuminated as excited 
teenagers that can be tolerated and might be stimulating but sooner or later these 
revolutionary mood would lose its zeal.
On the other hand, ironically, there are also proliferating accounts about the 
dominant paradigm and the field that conceives it neither monolithic nor uncontested or 
totally consistent, neither in the past nor in the present. Proliferated rereading and 
counter-memorializing of the great texts of the field that are conventionally presented as 
a consistent lineage that stretches from antique ages to the present upset the idea of a pre­
crisis past in the sense of coherent and consistent intellectual postures and unchanging 
foundations. These analyses invoke not an illustration of consensus inherent to the field, 
but the insidious strategies or sovereign practices that serve to hide discordant voices. 
Ashley mentions the use of the “taboo terms” as “instruments of political power” to 
secure disciplinary boundaries and the scientific status of the disciplined^. Taboo terms 
like the one mentioned by Ashley, i.e., economism, are designed to tackle with the 
contestations manifested by dissent voices and to silence them. Or to give another 
example, Ashley, in another article, “Poverty of Neorealism”, defies the understanding of 
smooth or evolutionary progress of the field by declaring neorealism as more a fallacious
^^Holsti, op. c it . note 17.Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two approaches”, International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol:32 No:4 (1988), 379-396.
For an e.xainple see Yohan ArrilTm, “Tlie Return of Marx in International Relations Tlieory”, (Review 
article). Economy and Society, Vol:25 No;l (1996), p. 128.
12
pretender than a righteous inheritor to realism^ ®. Walker’s point that although a long list 
of names are traditionally connoted with the single label of realism there are significant 
rifts between these alleged realists, like Hobbes and Machiavelli^*, deflects the image of a 
unitary, unchanging or at least consistent realist core that defines the ‘discipline of 
international relations’. Walker conveniently asserts that “political realism must be 
understood less as a coherent theoretical position in its own right than as the site of a 
great many contested claims and metaphysical disputes” It is evident that “claims to 
realism in international political theory carry meanings and implications from a much 
broader discourse about politics and philosophy”^^ . The point is that only a selective and 
biased reading of these celebrated sources represent them as coherent and consistent.
This confusion of contrasting viewpoints about the state of discipline and the 
crisis that it is alleged to be experiencing provides a propitious starting point for our 
analysis of the so-called ‘third debate’ or emerging dissidence. As Ashley and Walker 
rightly stress, “remembrances of a supposed “pre-crisis past” are by much a part of the 
disputed terrain in the crisis of today” '^’.
“ ...Dissident works of thought, we can say at the outset, liave not incited a sense of crisis by 
approacliing a naive and insular discipline, a paradigm, or tradition from beyond its boundaries, as if 
bearing news from far-off lands or, as detractors miglit say, from the foreign capitols of 
contemporary fasliion .... All of tliese images involve imagining territories, borders, walls already in 
place.
...If, in crisis, we are unable to decide how to limit, read, and remember the textual history in which 
to anchor a discipline or paradigm, this can only be because the textual history to which we refer has 
never been a territory of unequivocal and contuuious meaning. It has never been fixed througli time, 
well-bounded, and closed to contesting interpretations. The disciplines textual history has always
^^Richard K. Ashley, “Tlrree Modes of Economism”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol:27 (Winter 
1983), 464-5.
'^’Richard K. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism”, International Organization, Vol.: 38 (Spring, 1984)
^'R. B. J. Walker, “Realism, Change, and International Political Theoiy'”, International Studies Quarterly, 
Vol:31 No; 1 (1987). pp.70-4.
Ibid., p.67.
Ibid., p.67.
^''Richard K. Ashley, R. B. J. Walker, “CONCLUSION- Reading Dissidence/ Writing the Discipline: Crisis 
and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies”, International Studies Quarterly, Special Issue,
Vol. 34, No.3, September 1990h, p. 387.
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been paradoxically open to a proliferation of mutually destabilizing readings, It has always 
contained tensions and paradoxes that not only threaten to undo the supposed certitude of any 
position from which interpretation proceeds but also threaten to make way for other readings that 
a supposedly correct reading, to be thought correct, must exclude." ^^(emphasis added)
These “remembrances of a pre-crisis past”; however are also arbitrary and the
result of a power play as the supposed boundaries of the discipline itself It is aimed to
create a sovereign effect in order to be able to speak from the locus of the privileged
sovereign core of a discipline. As the divisions of disciplines are as arbitrary as the
boundaries of the states, dissidents that traverse these boundaries are always likely to be
existent. The discipline is considered to be insular as long as these persona non grata can
be dispelled from the sovereign domain of the discipline or normalized within it.
“ ...Even if its possible to romanticize a past in which the discourse of international studies manage 
to sustam some semblance of an unequivocal voice at one with a continuous disciplinary heritage 
and occupying a definite territorial domain, tliis could not have been because tliis voice and the 
supposed boundaries demarcating its place really were fixed, sure, and midisputed. It could only 
have been because it was possible for a time (and by means analyzable) actively to marginalize, 
forget, and defer encounters with paradoxes, contesting themes, and resistait interpretations that are 
always part of the disciplinary inlieritance, that transgress all imaginable boundaries, and that render 
radically unstable all renditions of an unequivocal voice. It could only have been because it was 
possible for a time to marginalize the very paradoxes, themes, and interpretations whose increasing 
visibility at the supposed core of lire disciplme have produced tlie sense of disciplinary crisis
today. >36
Hence, the sovereign ‘core’ of a discipline which determines the right questions to 
be asked, forbidden zones to be avoided and adequate answers to be given as we have 
seen in the examples of Viotti and Kauppi, Mansbach and Ferguson or Adams and 
Schwabe, is not “a territory, position or homogeneous point of view anchored and 
defined by reference to a coherent, continuous and well-bounded textual inheritance”. In 
Ashley and Walker’s words;
“What constitutes a “core” is the ability, in whatever location, actively to sustain for some time a 




labors by which, even now, memorializing readings of a textual inheritance are undertaken and 
unsettling encounters with paradoxes of space, time, and identity are marginalized.”^^
Now, let us return to our first question: What is the difference of today’s crisis?
Or what is the reason of this exacerbated sense of crisis? To give an answer to this
question we have to first reformulate anew the term "crisis” itself Fortunately this term
does not remind any more the perpetual frustration of the yearnings to become a rigorous
science fashioned in the model of positivist natural sciences. Following Ashley and
Walker, if we highlight the “discipline’s opening out into a region of intrinsically
ambiguous, intrinsically indeterminate activity” -where all boundaries are insecure,
conceived as arbitrary and contingent and where endeavour to enclose a safe terrain for
the discipline are faced up with the unruliness of the marginal sites- as the core of the
crisis we can conceive the present crisis in international relations as
“..a crisis tliat folds out beyond a discipline’s imagined boundaries, comiecting to a crisis of the 
human sciences, a crisis of patriarchy, a crisis of governability, a crisis of late industrial society, 
a generalized crisis of modernity” *^
Then, it becomes visible that this exacerbated sense of crisis is intimately related 
to the increasing visibility of the “active and arbitrary work of marginalization”^^  which 
was in turn caused by the proliferating “marginal sites” in late industrial society'”’. These 
marginal sites, characterized by the dearth of a “unique and ultimate sovereign identity” 
are “intrinsically ambiguous” sites of perpetual struggle where to “construct a coherent 
representation that excludes contesting interpretations” is not possible or at least not 




‘^ ^Richard K Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, “Speaking the Language Dissident of Exile: Thought in 
Inteniational Studies”, International Studies Quarterly, Special Issue, Voi 34, No.3, September 1990a,
p.260.
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constructs of a “sovereign subject of knowledge” whose ability to create the effect of 
sovereignty is injured“^*
1.3. Common Grounds, Different Strategies
This definition of the present crisis that folds out beyond the imaginary boundaries of a 
single discipline and reveals its intimacy with the crisis of modernity or in other words a 
disbelief in the discourses of modernity - “all varieties of social and political thought 
dominant in the west since the Enlightenmenf’^ ^^ -sets our starting point to delineate a 
common ground for the wide variety of critical perspectives, proliferation of which are 
held to be the source of today’s crisis that has been aggravated in the field, by the circles 
who held themselves to be the hard-core of the discipline as being “the children of the 
Enlightenment”'’^ . The critical turn in international relations, beside stretching to 
interdisciplinary sources, has also been compounded by the end of the Cold War era and 
sudden transformations of the global politics experienced in the immediate aftermath of
it'·'’.
Relocating the recent critical turn in international relations as a parallel debate to 
that of the wider debate going on in Western social sciences provides an efficient way to 
understand its commonalties. This common ground can be labelled as the “critical social 
theory”'*^ . In Lapid’s view “demise of the empiricist-positivist promise for a cumulative
ibid., p.260-2.
'’"Chris Brown, “ ‘Turtles All tlie Way Down’: Anti-Foundationalisin, Critical Theory and Intemational
RclalioJis", M7/e/v/v/w///.· Juumul oflnlemuiioiuuSluJie.'i, Vol. 23 No 2 (1994), p.214.
Keohane, op. cit. note 24.
’’Andrew Linklater, “Dialogue, Dialectic and Emancipation in Intemational Relations at the End of the 
Post-War Age”, Millenium: Journal o f International Studies, Vole 23 No 1 (1994), p. 120.
Here, the term social theory is used in a broad sense as the textiae of social sciences, in the words of 
Anthony Giddens;
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behavioral science recently has forced scholars from nearly all the social disciplines to 
reexamine the ontological, epistemological, and axiological foundations of their scientific 
endeavors.” This requestioning of the foundations culminated in “an acute bout of self­
doubt and heightened metatheoretical ferment” through which the “most highly prized 
premises of Western academic discourse concerning the nature of our social knowledge, 
its acquisition, and its utility -  including shibboleth such as “truth”, “rationality”, 
“objectivity”, “reality”, and “consensus” - have come under renewed critical reflection'*''.
Critical social theory itself is not a monolithic, coherent body of thought, it is a 
“wider search for thinking space” within contemporary social theory centered on a broad 
“agenda of dissent”. It is an “ongoing interdisciplinary debate of Western social theory 
which was sought to problematize the entrenched legacies of an Enlightenment concept 
of history, the relation between power and knowledge and the character of human 
sciences”'*^ . From the outset, what seems sanguine about the present crisis is that the 
exceptional challenges of the recent years have brought forth “an appreciation for 
previously “alien” approaches to knowledge and society, drawn from interdisciplinary 
sources”'*^ and the termination of relative isolation of the field'*^ .
“Social Theory... spans social science. It is a body of theory shared in common by al the disciplines
concerned with the behaviour of human beings. It concerns.....sociology, economics, politics, human
geography, psychology- the whole range of the social sciences. Neitlier is social theory readily separable 
from questions of interest to sm ever wider set of concerns: it coiuiects tlwougli to literary criticism on the 
one hand and to tlie philosophy of social sciences on the other.”
Cited in Jim George, “International Relations and tlie Search for Tliinking Space: Another View of the 
Third Debate”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol:33 No:3 (1990), p.271. This definition is widely 
accepted among the writers of the critical turn. See, Keyman, op. cit note 1 land David Campbell and Jim 
George, “Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Dilference: Critical Social Theory and International 
^e\i\{\Qi\s'\Jnternational studies Quarterly (1990) 34, 269-293.
Lapid, op. cit. note 14, p.236.
George and Campbell, op. cit. note 41, pp.269-71.
'*** George, op. cit. note 41, p. 269.
’’ Linklater, op. cit. note 40, p. 119.
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Underlining this common background, we can posit several common themes in 
the critical turn of the recent years in the field of international relations.^® Keyman 
enumerates three different levels that the critical approaches in international relations 
launched assail in a parallel way to the wider dissent in social sciences. These levels, 
Keyman posits, are epistemological, ontological and normative^\ Although common 
themes are separated as distinct levels, it must be considered as due to the exigency to 
render the critical move more easily comprehensible, for they are intimately related, and 
even intertwined^^ as indispensable elements of a whole, one level entailing other 
inexorable or possible.
1.3.1 Epistemological Contentions
The first common feature of the critical discourses in international relations is the 
question of epistemology which first and foremost highlights the inadequacies of the 
positivist/empiricist approach -that serve as the dominant theory of knowledge both in 
classical realism, neorealism and in its modified versions- in understanding society and
In face of the enormous complexity of the critical approaches, endeavours to delineate a common posture 
for these approaches, some kind of a common agenda of dissent, can be found abundantly in the recent 
literature. Lapid, pointing the new philosopliical posture underlying these dissident voices concerned 
mainly with the epistemological issues and higlilights three important interrelated themes -paradigmatism, 
perspectivism and relativism- which has shaken tlie positivist orthodoxy. George (1990) also focus on 
mainly with the question related to knowledge, its construction, how the claims of truth are forwarded, 
made possible on what kind of grounds, how they are sustained. George and Campbell (1990) used same 
classification with a sliglit revision. In addition to George’s initial list tliey mention the “extension of these 
issues to the construction of meairing and identity in allits forms” and the question of subjectivity. For the 
purposes of this study classification of Keyman (1996) is more appropriate as it is more extensive and 
offers a more comprehensive illustration of the critical move in international relations. In this subject, we 
will heavily rely on Keyman’s classification.
Keyman, op. cit. note 13, pp.4-12.
See Viviemic Jabri and Stephen Chan, “Tlie ontologists always rings twice: two more stories about 
simeinK and ag&ncy", Review o f International Studies, VoI:22No:l (January 1996), 107-1 lO.and Martin 
Hollis and Steve Smith, “A Response: Why Epistemology Matters in International Theory”, Review o f  
International Studies, Vol:22 No: 1 (January 1996), pp. 111-116, lor a debate on the relation between 
ontological and epistemological ‘projects’. While Jabre and Chan are advocating the essential ascendancy 
of ontological ‘projects’ for post-positivist international relations theory, Hollis and Smith are contending 
that the two projects are intertwined and indispensable to each other. Virile assuming the argument of
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politics^^. Epistemological debates also provide a way for self-reflection of scientific 
enterprises^"*. Labeling of these approaches in an all-encompassing sense as “post- 
positivist”^^  might be telling in the sense that epistemological questioning lies at the heart 
of these debates.
The epistemological questioning can be epitomized as the problematization of 
representation, i.e., “the assumption that the theory corresponds to the external reality 
which it represents” or in other words problematization of the “casual” relation between 
the representing and represented^*" that positivist/empiricist epistemologies commenced 
from. Positivism’s “ahistorical and extra social” “knowledge-defining standards “which 
are sanctified as if they were ‘nature’s own’ or given human standards and constructed on 
the tenet of ‘“truth as correspondence’ to ‘the facts’” is shaken by the contention that 
“ideas, words and language are not ‘mirrors which copy the “real””” . The foundations of
r O
the 'tme knowledge’ are shaken deeply. This problematization has the merit of 
revealing the political character of epistemology by the underlying relationship between 
power and knowledge and thus challenging the potentially autonomous conception of
Hollis and Smith, one more point that is to be underlined is their common conviction that imiversalist 
epistemological assertions must be eschewed.
See George, op. cit. note 41, p.272 and Jim George, “Understanding International Relations after the 
Cold War: Probing beyond the Realist Legacy” in Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker (eds.). 
Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities. Vol:2, (Mimieapolis-London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 40-53.
"^^ Mark Neufeld, “Reflexivity and International Relattions Tlieory”, Milleimium Journal o f International 
Studies, (1993,Vol 22 Nol, p.55.
See. International Studies Quarterly Special Issue, Vol.: 33 No:3 for a multisided debate of this trend in 
international relations.
Key man, op. cit. note 13, p. 5.
Neufeld, op. cit. note 50.
Anti-foundationalism in the sense of being against foundationalism of discourses of modernity might be 
considered as a common theme of the critical approaches. Chris Brown (1994) uses ^antifoundalionalisnC 
as a scale against which critical approaches can be categorised as reconstructive those trying to find new 
foundations (e.g. Habermasian Critical Thcory)and dcconstructive those celebrating unhindered pluralism 
brought about by anti-foundationalism(e.g. postmodernism advocated by Ashley and Walker) and 
appreciates the ones stood as a secure midwa}'house as opposed to the two extreme responses. Brown
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epistemology. Now, realist paradigm itself arises as practice, unfortunately complicit 
with the power politics that it putatively only analyzes and could not find an alibi easily.
Underlying this problematization is a new postulation of science and scientific 
knowledge as a “triadic complex” consisting of 1) a “phenomenic” axis covering the 
empirical content of scientific theories; 2) an “analytic axis” covering hypotheses, 
explanations, and theoretical models; and 3) a “thematic axis” covering reality defining 
assumptions, epistemological premises, and other types of distinctly “ideological” or 
“metaphysical” ingredients”^^ . This vision of science makes “eliminability of the human” 
impossible. '^^ “Critical social theory draws our attention to the way in which the 
discursive effect of the representation occurs within the realm whereby human agents are 
in a position to convey a meaning to the represented” So the subject of knowledge 
does not merely describe and explain the “reality” that s/he investigates but recreates it 
within a discourse or, in other words, within the confines of “supportive meta-scientific 
domains in which they are holistically embedded”*'^  that is centered around a certain 
position of subjectivity.
By this understanding every representation is a misrepresentation to an extent. By 
this stand the object-subject duality, the myth of objectivity which are embedded in 
positivist-empiricist approaches are challenged by a double move of intersubjectivity. 
Not only the object of knowledge but also the subject can not be considered as given and 
hence, the existence of a space where the absolute truth can be revealed could be 
considered to exist. This can be epitomized as the repudiation of the “external sources of
conveniently points that deconstructive approaches are less susceptible to criticism with respect to theory 
than to practice 
Lapid, op. cit. note 14, p. 240.
“  Ibid.
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understanding” and as a “concern to ground meaning as unambiguously social, historical, 
and linguistic in construction, and to connect knowledge to power”^^ . This stress on the 
social, historical, and cultural themes rather than other themes “reliant on “cogito” 
rationalism, notions of autonomous individualism, or variants on the “sense data” or 
“correspondence rule” formats in the construction of knowledge”'^ '*, i.e., anti- 
foundationalism embedded in the critical turn, dislocates the sovereign subject of 
knowledge which has a privileged content of Cartesian rational cogito or occupies “an 
independent foundation, or Archimedian point, from which to orient or judge social 
action”^^ . In short the epistemological questioning destabilizes a set of themes related to 
the acquisition and justification of scientific knowledge that has been taken for granted 
for so long. However, this does not mean the denial of all epistemological grounds, 
although there exists no consensus for the appropriate epistemological tenets for a critical 
international relations theory. The most significant achievement of these endeavour is 
likely to be the acquiescence of the plurality of possible epistemological stances.
1.3.2 Ontological Inquiry: Essentially Contested Concepts
The absorption of these epistemological questions into the international relations field has 
shaken the “orthodoxy at the North American disciplinary centre that acknowledged as 
valid only one form of knowledge (scientific rationalism), one methodology (deductivist 
empiricism), and one research orientation (problem -solving).W hen epistemology is 
politicised in this manner, in more explicit terms, when the insidious myth of subject- 
object duality and hence the ensuing claim of objectivity is challenged, and the sovereign
Keynian, op. cit. note 11, p. 5. 
Lapid, op. cit. note 14, p. 240.
63
6-1
George and Campbell, op. cit. note 41, p. 270. 
George, op. cit. note 41, p.272.
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privileged subject of knowledge is dislocated, doors for the second common endeavour of 
the critical approaches in international relations -namely the question of ontology- fling 
open.
The intimate relationship between the first and the second level can be explained 
by the “positivist bias”. Positivism dominated the 20th century scientific enterprises as an 
epistemological bias*"^ . Positivist bias rests on a “ radical distinction between facts and 
values which accords epistemological priority to factual k n o w l e d g e . T h e  basic 
assumption of the positivism about the social reality is that it is accessible to anyone who 
would observe them.^ .^ By simply observing facts, it is possible to formulate “ objective” 
factual statements that are supposed to be congruent with the social reality™.
Trying to overcome this epistemological bias, critical endeavour in the 
ontological level directed an assail on the conceptual framework and unit of analysis of 
the international relations which are “avowedly rationalistic” . These concepts or 
categories created through a positivist bias “seem to have a clear and solid meaning, a 
referent in the world, and to be the sort of self evident social reality that needs no other 
explication”™. Nevertheless all these terms are rather elusive, volatile and informed by 
philosophical beliefs. At the ontological level critical approaches try to destabilize these 
understandings by revealing this nature of these concepts. On the other hand, ontological 
questioning has the task of uncovering what is covered, mentioning explicitly what is
George and Campbell, op. cit. note 41, p.270. 
ibid., p.382.
FROST, M., Towards a Nomiative Tlieory of International Relations. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 1989), p.l 1. 
ibid.
ibid., p. 16. 
ibid.
^'Keohane, op. cit. note 24, p. 381.
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implicitly presumed, however, what is on the other hand, underlying, always referred 
implicitly and venerated as the unchallenged boundaries of modern political thinking. 
Underlying this effort is the “the desire to change “the categorical structure and patterns 
within which we think and act”^^ .
These categories of the political discourse are typically appraisive’'^  and these 
appraisive concepts are constructed by not merely naming something but by 
characterizing it.
“A description does not refer to data or elements tliat are bound together merely on the basis of 
similarities adliering m them, but to describe is to characterize a situation from the vantage point of 
certain interests, purposes, or standards”’^
Thus the separation of normative/empirical is rather artificial and constraining in
the sense that it severes the relation between any concept and the point of view from
which it has been ideated and to transcend limits imposed by this distinction concepts
must be understood by their ‘maternal sources’. As William Connolly has stated;
“The terms of political discourse set the frame within wliich political thouglit and action proceed. To 
examine that discourse is to translate tacit judgements embedded in the language of politics into 
explicit considerations more fully subject to critical assessment.”
Naturally, ardent exponents of representational epistemology hold their categories 
as if they are reflecting reality exactly as it is and in this sense s/he is a philosophical 
idealist in the depths of her/his heart that the world’s nature is prearranged to adopt the
Nash, Maiming. ‘Ethnicity and Vicissitudes- The Ethnicity in tlie Modem World. (Chicago- London; Tlie 
University of Cliicago Press, 1989), pp.1-3.
”  George, op. cit. note 41, p.270.
See William E. Coimolly, Temis of the Political Discourse.3'‘‘ Edition, (Oxford UK- Cambridge USA: 
Blackwell,1993). Connolly borrows tliis term from W. B. Gallie. A concept can be appraisive “in tliat the 
state of affairs it describes is a valued acluevemenf’(lO). Also Comiolly describes the “essentially contested
concepts” as;
“..when the practice described is internally complex in that its cliaracterisation involves reference to several 
dimensions, and when the agreed and contested rules of application are relatively open, enabling parlies to 
interpret even those shared rules differently as new and unforeseen situations arise, then the concept in 
question is an “essentially contested concept”.
Ibid., p.23.
76 ibid., preface lo the third edition.
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metaphors that he has ideated in his/her mind’ .^ They are made possible by the 
rationalistic texture (or posture) of the international relations theories which has 
presumed a foundational rationality that naturally entails and requires
“a sliarp distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, a clear delineation between 
descriptive and nonnative statements, and a neutral metliod of discrimination (such as falsification 
or some prmciple of confirmation) through which scientific (testable) theories could be 
distinguished from un- or extra scientific doctrine”
The epistemological question that is taken forward by the critical turn, at this 
point renders the réévaluation of these concepts. In the field of international relations, 
critical assessment on the ontological level focuses mainly on the “taken-for-granted 
ontological categories of “the international”, “totality”, and “historicity” on the basis of 
which fundamental concepts of IR are produced such as globalization, the state, and 
hegem ony.Critical writers such as Ashley, Linklater or Rob Walker first initiated their 
assaults on the conventional theories of international relations by interrogating these 
concepts.
Especially the concern with “the intci national”^^  has a special resonance in the 
recent critical literature as this concept itself served as a significant pretext for the efforts 
to delineate the borders of the discipline and impose a certain interpretation, that is the
”  Connolly, 1995, p.5. 
Koyman, op. cit. note 11, p.6.
79 The two other concepts would not be mentioned due to the lack of space. Keyman epitomise the concept 
of totality problematized as tlie conception of international as an “organic totality which acts as a reality in 
itself, expresses the functioning of its parts, and thus engenders regularities in itself to secure its 
reproduction as a whole.”( 1996,9) For an example of tliis theme as a harsh critique of neorealism and its 
stnicturalist leanings see. Asliley, “The Poverty of Neorealism” (1984). Tliis line of critique can also be 
found witliin the critiques of Marxist and Neo-Marxist approaches. Tlie concept of historicity mainly refers 
to the problematization of “the determinate reality of an objective historical process”(ibid,10) or more 
explicitly it refers to the critiques of linear evolutionist understanding of history that represents history as a 
teleological process that is fonvarded and destined to reach a certain end.(Kcyman, Mutman, Ycgeiioglu 
1996:9) This Eurocentric narratives of liistory signifies West as the vanguard of humanity and so the rest of 
the world has been located as the natural followers that could often despite their strong yearnings and 
laborious endeavours considered to be hopeless to catch up with the dazzling achievements of West . See 
Samir Amin, Eurocentricism, (trans. By Russell Moore) (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989), pp.
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realist paradigm, on to this created cosmos which is characterized by the lack of 
community or by the omnipotence of anarchy^ *^. We might highlight two main responses 
to this issue. The first, might be labelled as the post-structuralist stance, which conceives 
the problematization of “the international” as a prerequisite for initiating a critical 
inquiry. To open the gates of international relations field to critical approaches, that are 
“inherently communitarian” in that they “stress the community-shared background 
understandings, skills, and practical predisposition’s without which it would be 
impossible to interpret action, assign meaning, legitimate practices, empower agents, and 
constitute a differentiate, highly structured social reality” , Ashley argues, the concept of 
community must be reformulated so that it would not come to an end by the frontiers of 
the state**^ .
The second response came from Habermasian Critical Theory as an attempt to 
develop an emancipatory project underlining universality. Andrew Linklater highlights 
the tension between universalism and particularism as a recurrent theme of the 
international thought that involves “three competing visions of community -the nation­
state, the society of states, or a community of humankind” constituted on different levels 
of commonness and a problematic of conferring primacy upon one of them and takes his 
stance at the universalist side to develop the defense of a universal community.**^
1.3.3 Normative Level: Emancipatory Projects
1-10, and Bryan S. Turner, Orientalism. Postmodeniism and Globalism. (London- New York: Routledge, 
1994),pp. 39-42.
““Riehard K. Ashley, “The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of
International Politics”, zl//i’r/7fl//ve.v, Vol:12 (1987), p.404.





later, ‘The Problem of Community in International Relations”, Alternatives, Vol:15 No:2
25
These two levels of the critical approach intermingled with the third one, that is the 
normative level. This level also constitutes the most lively one in which an ongoing 
debate or in better terms a dialogue persisted among the different strands of the critical 
approaches. There is a common aim of traversing the constraints imposed on thinking by 
the discourse of modernity, and helping to flourish creativity in that new alternatives can 
be ideated, dissident voices can be aggrandized.**'* However, this aim of creating 
emancipatory projects has taken different and often contrasting forms.
In this level the problematic of identity/difference**  ^ gains a special resonance
which points out the ways to recognize the “other”. This poses a challenge to the claims
of superiority of the one particular identity -Western rational subject.
“This in turn brings to the fore the question “democratic community” that is the question of the 
recognition of the other as difference. The point here is that the more international relations theory is 
derived from a strong Western rationalist and universalist posture, the more it reduces the “ethical 
space” for the other to represent itself in its own ownership of its history. Tims, IR theory tend to 
dissolve the Other into the miitary conception of the modern self as a rational, knowing subject, to 
privilege tliat self as the miiversal point of reference, and limits the political imagination, that is, the 
imposition of limits on the way in which we tliink about community. Hence, wliile as a discipline in 
constant interaction witli the Other (whether it be female, racial or cultiual/etlmic Otlrer), IR tlieory 
eperi’.tcs as a practice of inclusion/exclusion, in which the privileged role of the V/cctcrr. .sever-'-ig·.; 
self is maintained as a rational, Cartesian, modem cogito, and what is perceived as its Other is 
excluded, marginalized, and denied to be recognized as different.^*'
Thus first we have to underline the flourished meta-theoretical ferment in 
international relations studies as an expression of the increasing sensitivity to the question 
of self-reflectivity.^^ These common themes are harbingers of a new interest in the
'' Key man, op. cit note I, p. 11.
Connolly defines this problematic as the “paradoxical relation of identity to difference”. Identity (that is 
“us”) is defined not in absolute tenns existing in ideal or prior to any existence but as a result of the nature 
of language always “consolidates and stabilises itself by distinguishing itself from different modes of 
bcing”(1993. Preface to the Third Edition)
Keyman, op. cit. note 11, p.l 1.
See Mark Neufeld,(1993;53-61) for the relation between the traditional lack of reflectivily and neglect of 
metathcoretical questions. Neufeld defines reflectivity as “reflection on the process of theorising” and 
enumerates three core elements for reflexivity in tenns of international relations theories;
“(i) self-awareness regarding underlying premises, (ii) the recognition of the inherently politico-normative 
dimension of paradigms and the normal science tradition they sustain, and (iii) the affirmation that
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discipline itself as if the discipline and scholars concerned with this field of study stop 
and try to look at themselves and their works, beside the subject matter studied. In this 
sense Keohane’s reference to the critical turn as the “reflective approaches’’^  ^ is telling. 
For these approaches have the merit of not only criticizing individual theories but the 
gospel of the field and they try to locate not only the international relations as the subject 
matter but also the study of it within the context of modernity where it has taken its roots. 
Thus, “the question of modernity”*^  constitutes the central issue in the ‘disciplinary 
crisis’ of international relations field in two respects; first it is an indispensable element 
in shaping the contemporary world, second, it is a necessary point of reference to reflect 
upon the field.
“JR theory functions as a gendered and occidental metanarrative of modernity, and for this reason an 
effective critique of theory can be achieved by locating it into the philosophical discourse of 
modernity.’’^ ®
1.4. Defense From the Mainstream
After making clear what stood for today’s crisis we have to mention that it is not all 
accepted by all the scholars in the field. After a period of unrecognition, it has faced with 
resentment and counter criticisms. Keohane, one of the most liberal scholars who can be 
considered within the main stream as we consider the responses to the critical turn^’, was 
one of the first mainstream scholars who felt the necessity to give a response to the
reasoned judgements about the merits of contending paradigms are possible in the absence of a neutral 
observation language.”(55)
Among these elements the tlrird one is probably the most debatable under the designator of the problematic 
of incommensurability.
Keohane, op. cit. note 24.
**®Richard Devetak, “Tlie Project of Modernity and Itrternational Relations Theory”, Millennium, (Vol.24, 
No I, 1995, p. 27.
Keyman, op. cit. note 11, p. 11.
William E.Connolly, Kimlik ve Farklılık- Siyasetin Açmazhuına Dair Demokratik Çözüm Önerileri, 
trans, by Ferma Lekesizalm, (İstanbul:Ayrinti Yayınları, 1995), p.77.
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dissident voices. Keohane first admits that “ the reflective approach” which he 
differentiated from the sociological approaches to the international institutions^^ rightly 
underlined the inadequacies and failure of the rationalistic approaches to international 
relations^^ He underlined the critics’ point that individual agents’ interest can not be 
considered as a given but must be considered as “affected by institutional arrangements, 
by prevailing norms, and by historically contingent discourse” and continued that the 
merits of both approaches -rationalistic and reflective- must be taken into 
consideration' '^*. And then, Keohane forwarded his main counter critique; “the greatest 
weakness of the reflective school lies... in the lack of a clear reflective research program 
that could be employed by students of world politics”^^ .
Holsti feels the need to remind in the face of celebratory responses to the critical 
turn in international relations, that flourishing of new approaches is not good in and of 
themselves but can be venerated as long as they help to increase our understanding of the 
“reality” and props up his argument by emphasizing that “the main purpose of the 
theoretical activity” is to render the world around us comprehensible” *^’ not to make it 
incomprehensible by an uncontrollable proliferation of theoretical approaches. Also 
Biersteker argues that critical approaches, challenging the foundations of conventional 
scientific endeavors, itself did not provide “any clear criteria for choosing among the 
multiple and competing explanations it produces”^^ , thus points out the danger of 
debilitating nihilism, accepting no foundation to base true knowledge, recognizing no
92 Kcoliane, op. cit. note 24, p.383, defines institution as “a general ijattern or categorization of activity or a







Holsti, op. cit. note 17, pp.255-6.
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reality. To show that-these approaches are worthy of veneration they have to move 
beyond criticism or metatheoretical scrutinization at which they proved to be worthy of 
appreciation and must “engage in the construction and elaboration of alternative 
interpretations or understandings”^^ . This same point is reiterated by Marco Verweij. He 
concluded that as long as critical approaches lack “a clear research program” they are 
destined to remain as the dissident voices at the margins of the discipline’“®.
Critiques point the same direction; there is not an alternative (empirical) research 
program, and even tough the objections of the critiques of rationalistic approaches could 
have merit, they did not necessitate that the rationalistic approaches be abandoned, but 
rationalist approaches might be supplemented. This view has two interrelated 
implications. First it creates a “take it or leave it” situation for the readers. The alleged 
choice must be between the old guy who proved its merits and the “reflective” 
approaches which are good at criticizing but still did not provide something that can be 
compared to that of rationalistic approaches and carry the imminent dangers of ceaseless 
debate and theoretical confusion without any prospect of reaching a consensus. They all 
accept that rationalistic approaches have some failures or inadequacies to grasp the 
“realities” of the world and to provide a complete depiction of it, but still they are useful 
tools as they help to develop an understanding of the world. This is a reaffirmation of 
‘yesterday’s crisis’ and a reassertion of it as the best malaise that is bearable and can be
98
Thomas J. Biersteker, “Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in Intematiomil Relations”, International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol;33 No;3 (1989),263-267
^  This point would be handled in the next chapter, as it has a significant place in the dialogue between 
scholars committed to the different strands of the critical approaches.
Ibid., p.266.-
Marco Verweij, “Cultural Theory and the Study of International Relations”, Millenium, (Vol. 24, No. 1, 
I995),pp. 87-8.
29
hoped to be recovered’in time, even maybe by the stimulation given by the “reflective 
approaches”.
The important point that must be underlined is that counter critics are launching 
their assails from a position of denial and ignorance. They do not mention that the 
dissidents are resenting just to this conception of theoretical activity as a neutral tool to 
reflect upon the world and opposing just to this vision of social reality existing outside 
the subject of knowledge waiting to be discovered. They made this critique without 
mentioning that critical turn in international relations mainly centered around the 
rejection of the empirico-analytical conception of theories. So the research program of 
the critical turn is not and cannot be a “rationalist or empirical” one but it is “historical 
and emancipatory” ‘^^V On the other hand it is undue to claim that critical writers are only 
interested with meta-theoretical scrutinization. It is visible in recent studies that a new 
phase has started in which these writers begin their “relay function” drawing on the 
insights of the critical turn''^’. There are increasing efforts within the critical terrains to 
initiate theory construction.
' “‘Keyman, op. cit. 13, p.94. Ashley and Walker (1990b) admit tliat critical turn eschews to construct an “ 
“alternative” paradigm or framework” and justifies this as an expedient strategy in the face of both practical 
and theoretical exigencies of the field. (398) However, this stance can not be generalised as illuminating for 
the whole area of dissidents. For example William E. Coimoly tries to provide an alternative to theory 
building within the poststructuralist/postinodemist frameworks, instead of being limited to 
deconstruction. (1995,84-5)
' ““Ashley and Walker, op. cit note 30, p. 398. See Inteniational Studies Quarterly Special Issue, Vol:34, 
No:3 (Sep. 1990) for articles about different subjects ranging from security to international debt using the 
main premises of the critical turn (mainly poststucturalist.
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CHAPTER II: FOCUS ON POSTMODERNISM
2.1. Postmodernism: A Difficult Name to Articulate
In this section we will try to examine more closely one of the dissenting voices within the 
framework o f ‘present crisis’ that has been viewed in the first chapter. Postmodernism/ 
poststructuralism that posits probably the most challenging questions, that celebrates 
ambiguity as opposed to enclosure and represents a radical break with the rationalist- 
positivist approaches will be our main concern. Instead of trying to give a complete 
account of postmodernism, we will proceed with handling main critiques of it after a 
brief description of its most common elements that assume significance with respect to its 
reflections on politics and ethics.
Beside the complexity of the issues involved by postmodernism, this limitation 
posits itself as an exigency in the face of the fact that there is no postmodernism that can 
be considered as a “homogeneous entity” or a “consciously directed movement”\  There 
are several ways in which postmodernism can be seen - “as a particular type of textual 
practice or ‘style’, a cultural context^ and “a mode of analysis”  ^ as a philosophical
'Neville Wakefield, Postmodernism: The twilight of the Real. (London-WinchesteriPluto Press, 1990)
 ^ As a cultural context postmodernism involves intimate relations to a post-modem or late capitalist 
condition. Although featiues of this condition are illuminated in similar temis witli reference to tecluiology, 
communications systems, mass media etc., its relations with modem is complex and unconscnsual. Bie 
main problem is whctlier it is a mpture of the modem signifying the dawn of a new era or a continuation of 
it. Tire second point of divergence with respect to the new era or cultural is related to the nature of 
difference within this new context. See John R. Gibbins, “Contemporary Political Culture: An 
Introduction”, in John R. Gibbins (ed.), ContemDosrarv Political Culture: Politics in a Post modem Age, 
(London: Sage, 1989)
“While postmaterialism is a unified field of attitudes, postmodernism refers more generally to the
absence of unity and identity in contemporary culture. In short, a postmodern culture is one with no
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reassertion against modernity or as a theory. Partially, the ambiguity that surrounds the 
term ‘postmodernism’ can be partly explicated by its attachment to “numerous meanings 
within the context of art, theatre, film, literature, philosophy and sociology”'*. Secondly, 
the meaning of the term, postmodernism, variegates in accordance with the meaning 
attributed to ‘modern’ and prefix ‘post’.
Leaving aside the genealogy of the term ‘postmodernism’, we will limit our 
investigation mainly by its connotations in the political science and especially in 
international relations theory. Postmodernism is not based on one Weltanschauung but it 
involves different strands imbued with major philosophical differences^. Thus in the face 
of this wide variety of enmeshed and sometimes contrasting bundle of approaches it 
would be expedient to claim that there is not a “postmodernism” but “postmodernisms” .^
Our concern would be the postmodernism(s) as a “form of thought or trend within 
the humanities and the social sciences” that can be conveniently coined as a
linear pattern of change nor an identifiable form but is ratlier a picture of fragmentation, 
multidirectiomü change and a psychedelic collage of contemporary attitudes, values and beliefs.”
Tliis point constitutes one of the main cleavages between Critical Theory of Frankfiirt School and 
Postmodernism.
 ^Wakefield, op. cit. note 1, p.21.
^ See Gibbins op. cit. note 2, p. 14. IVkirgaret A. Rose in her book, The post-modern and tlie Post-industrial- 
A Critical Analysis. (New York- Melbourne- Posrchester-Sydney: Cambridge University Press,1991) 
offers an elaborate and detailed review of tlie usage of these two terms across a wide variety of disciplines 
stretching from hterature to architecture and from philosophy to geography, that dates back to 1914 for 
‘post-industrial’ and 1934 for ’post-modem’. Rose makes a distinction between the initial and most recent 
usages of the term ‘post-modem’ tliat in its recent meaning postmodernism involves reference to a ‘post- 
industrial’ age (20-21) which also has been assigned nmnerous and ambiguous meanings.
 ^ Margaret A. Rose, op. cit. note 4, p.l76., enumerates tliree broad categories within which tlie different 
strands of postmodernism can be placed as die “deconstmetionist”, “double-coded” and “ideal” 
postmodernisms according to tlieir conception of and tlieir stances vis-à-vis tlie modernity. Stephen K. 
White, Political Theory and Postmodernism, Modem European Pliilosophy Series, (Cambridge- New York- 
Port Chcslcr-Mclbourne-Sydney: Cambridge University Press. 1991), makes a distinction between 
“oppositional and non-oppositional modes of postmodern tliought” (1-2) witli respect to tlicir stance to tlie 
“modernity”.
^Sce James Der Derian, Antidiplomacv -spies, terror, speed, and war (Cambridge&Oxford: 
Blaclwell,1992), p.5.
 ^ See Gibbins, op. cit. note 2, p. 14. Brayn S. Turner, Orientalism. Postmodernism and Globalism. (London- 
New York: Routledge, 1994),p. 16.
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“metatheoretical paradigm” rather than a theory^. A long list of names could be 
enumerated as the father or main contributors to this trend, among whom Foucault, 
Derrida, Baudrilard, Kristeva, Barthes would be probably the most celebrated ones. 
Explicitly these names are ““foreign” to a discipline dominated from its Anglo-American 
center” .^ Furthermore, so-called postmodernists, these foreigners do not lend themselves 
and their ideas to be grouped under a single designator easily. It must be reminded from 
the outset that their ideas are not in complete accord with each other.
However there is a common ground that takes them together, and this is a
rereading of modernity, its main constitutive elements and its universal strategies'” or in
more explicit terms a problematization of sovereign practices of modernity, that is
instigated by the so-called postmodern condition. Linklater epitomizes this orientation.
“The central problem of post-modernists is Üie existence of ‘sovereign’ claims to shape human loyalties, 
construct linear histories and impose social and political boundaries, when truth and meaning are in 
doubt and forms of identity are in question.. .Post-modernism aims to bring all ‘sovereign’ solutions mto 
question.”'* *
'*' ?usimodernism’ assumes different meanings in the United States and in Continental Europe. Generally in 
the academic circles of the United States, French tliinkers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, Jacques 
Derrida, Jean Baudrillard are put together under the designator postmodernist or poststructuralist. However, 
strikingly these Parisien tliinkers refuse the title poststructmalist and even some consider tliemselves 
against the stances attributed to them as a classification and assume no compatriotship with other names in 
tlic same list of poststructuralists. It is ironical that tire idea of poststructuralist tlieoiy, genesis of which is 
attributed to tire French tliinkers is mainly an American enterprise. See, Juditlt Buttler, “Contingent 
Foundations” in Stephen Eric Bronner (ed.), Twentictlr Centiuv Political Tlieorv: A Reader. (New York- 
London: Routledge,1997), pp.248-249; Mark Poster, Critical Tlreorv and Poststructuralism- In Search of a 
Context (New York:Coniell University Press,I989), pp.4-7. Tirese writers taken together under tire single 
designation of ‘poststructuralist’ or ‘postmodernist’ by the help of the assmrrption tirat “theories offer 
themselves in buirdles or iir organized totalities and that historically a set of tlrcories which arc structurally 
similar emerge as tire articulation of an Iristorically specific coirdition of human reflectioir”. (Butler, 
1997:250) Tlris tendency which reflects a distaste for cacophoiry, uirdcnnincs plurality of intellectual 
endeavors and abundant dissonance among them.
**Jim George, “Understanding Intenrational Relations after tire Cold War: Probing beyond the Realist 
Legacy” in Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker (eds.), Challcnmng Boundaries: Global Flows. 
Territorial Identities. Vol:2, (Minneapolis-London: Umversity of Mimresota Press,1996), p.58.
See Fuat E. Keyman, “Farklılığa Direnmek: Uluslararasi İlişkiler Kuramında ‘Öteki’ Sonmu” in Fuat 
Keynıan, Mahmut Mutınan, Meyda Yeğenoğlu(eds.), Oryantalizm. Hegemonya ve Kültürel Fark. (İstanbul: 
İletişim Yayınları, 1996),p.73. and Wakefield, op. cit. note 1, p.20.
"Andrew Linklater, Tire Question of the Next Stage in Intenrational Relations Theory: A Critical- 
Theoretical Point of View”, Millenium: Journal o f International Studies, Vol:21 No:l (1992), p.88.
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Modernity has a special resonance within this context of the aim of ''bringing all
'sovereign’ solutions into question”. However, this element -i.e., problematization of
modernity does not provide a magic stick that could organize and give vivid strands to
the massive literature on post-modernism. As we have mentioned above, a plethora of
definitions of 'postmodern’ and 'postmodernism’ can fold out as it assumes different
meanings in accordance with the specific meaning attributed to modern and ensuing
derivatives of modernity, modernization, modernism and the prefix 'post’^^ . Modernity
signifies not a stale and coherent set of answers but more a given set of questions molded
within the container of modernity. It can be considered as a frame sculptured by
interpretations of the "persistent questions of meaning, the relation of human life to
nature, the relation of the present to the past and the future, the form of a well-grounded
order, and the relation of life to the death” "^^.
‘'Individualism and commimity, realism and idealism, the public interest and the common good, 
teclmocracy and humanism, positive and negative freedom, utility and riglits, empiricism and 
rationalism, liberahsm and collectivism, capitalism and socialism, democracy and totalitarianism -  
all grow up together within the confines of modernity. ..The fundamental importance of these 
differences must be comprehended in conjunction witli an appreciation of how they establish and 
delimit each otlier upon tlie field of modem discourse.
See Margareth A Rose, op. cit. note 4, p.l76.
Different understandings of the present crisis in the social sciences or in the field of international 
relations and variegated critical approaches are underlined mainly by different conceptions of modernity. 
Tlie miderstanding of modernity tliat is central to post modernism is in general focusing on the implications 
of modernity in relations of domination, control and power. However, the conception of modernity held by 
Habermasian Critical Tlieory differs radically and opens up a deep cleavage between these two critical 
strands with respect to their quest for a normative basis. For an example, see Ricliard Devetak, “The Project 
of Modernity and International Relations Tlieory”, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies (Vol.24, 
No 1, 1995), pp.30-2. Tlie conception of modernity as a project as it is borrowed from Habermas, Devetak 
argues, constitutes “a fruitful approach to tlie question of modernity”. The project of modernity can be 
epitomised as the “intentions of Enliglitemnent”, tliat are enumerated under the headings of “the ethos of 
critique” and “the spirit of cosmopolitanism”. This view, Devetak asserts, would provide a nonnative basis 
ill the dearth of universal foundaiions. But like otlicr writers affluent to Critical Thcoi*}', he sc\'crcs the 
relation between “project of modernity”, tliat is “intentions of the Enliglitemnent”, and its intimacy to a 
particular cultural domain intermingled with power relations thus bringing together the risk of establishing 
new hegemonies in the name of emancipation. Modernity in this sense is to be elevated to the status of a 
universal, transcendental foundation that an emancipatory project miglit be initiated tlirough 
communicative rationality or the progress of reason.
^"^William E. Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, (New York: Basil Black\vell, 1988), p.2.
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Only to the extent we can niap the terrain upon which these modem debates occur can we hope to 
open up possibilities of thought these very debates obscure.”'^
2.2. Attacks Against the Sovereign Practices
The frame of modernity delineates mainly the forbidden or irrelevant questions and once 
the realm of questions is constrained, then answers, which can be forwarded, are 
simultaneously and automatically limited. It erects an axis around which contrasting 
answers revolved within the same terrain of modernity. In order to map out the terrain in 
which modern solutions to modern questions are formulated, post-modernism brings 
forth a certain degree of skepticism toward master or grand narratives of modernity or in 
more fashionable terms “incredulity toward metanarrative”' .^ Leotard elicits these grand 
narratives as
“ ...overarclung philosophies of history such as the Enliglitenment view of the gradual but relentless 
progress of reason and freedom, Hegel’s dialectic of the spirit coming to know itself, and perliaps 
most importantly Marx’s drama of the forward march of human productive capacities via class 
conflict culminating in the just and revolutionary triumph of the proletariat”’^
These grand narratives are privileged discourses empowered to eharacterise and 
evaluate all other discourses but unreflective unto themselves. The most important 
function of them is that of legitimisation of “scientific-technological and political project 
in the modern world” by operating as interpretative schemes or “epistemological 
frameworks without which ‘man’, the subject of history, is decentered and the ‘universe’ 
is drifted into a new dark age in which chaos theory” reigns’^ .
2.2.1. The Quell o f the Truth: Gods of the Modem Man vs. Power-Knowledse
ibid., p.3.
'^Stephen K. Wliite, Political Tlieorv and Postmodernism. Modem European Philosophy Series, 
(Cambridge- New York-Port Chester-Melboume-Sydney; Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.4-5.
’’ Lyotard cited in Wakefield, op. cit., note 1, p.22.
White, op. cit., note 16, p.5.
35
One of the main assails of the postmodernism against modernity is directed by its 
interrogation of the myths about “truth”, the possibility of reaching it and the myth of 
progress intermingled with these myths. Underlying the advent of secularism as the 
“death of God”, Connolly illustrates the quest in Western thought for a foundational locus 
from which “truth” has emanated. Here secularism and humanism, hand in hand, tear the 
link between “world and creation” by taking into question “the assumptions about nature, 
knowledge, self, the past and language”, that is the cultural terrains on which God is 
enabled for his omnipotence .
In pre-modern readings of the world, it is characterised by harmony emanating 
from the will of the creator. The human being, through his will to knowledge, tries to 
understand the will of the ''great Harmonise” amidst the mysteries of the nature and 
hence to come closer to its creator^\ Once the idea that the "world is not God's creation” 
has been ideated, then truth is inexorably dispersed. Neither the world and hence 'truth' 
of it nor the human capacity to conceive it can be presumed as predesigned to match each 
other any longer.
“If the world is not God’s creation, truth is jeopardized. For, Nietzsche contends, tlie 
correspondence tlieory of trutli, the theory that defines taie statements to be those that ‘correspond’ 
to the way tlie world is in itself, is a tliinly veiled theology. If the world is not designed by a creator, 
it is very unlikely that human capacities for cognition will correspond to the way the world is in 
itself or that the shape of the world will correspond to the human ability to know it. In an uncreated 
world the very possibility of correspondence between a knowing self and a world to be known 
depends upon an improbable coincidence of human capacity with worldly structure. No pre-design 
o f knowing self and known world ensures the coincidence sought The will to knowledge is likely to 
encounter that which does not articulate smoothly with the categories imposed upon it Once the 
import of the death of the God becomes apparent to those who killed İhın, the ‘will to truth’ will 
appear as the will to impose human form upon the world and then to treat the imposition as if it 
were a discovery. The more tenacious that will is the more insistent it will have to be in making the 
world over to fit into its capacities for knowing and the more rutlhess it will have to be with those 
people, actions and events deemed by it to be abnonnal. irmtional, pcn'crse, unnatural or
Wakefield, op. cit., note 1, p.22. 
Connolly, op. cit, note 14, pp.7-9. 
ibid., p.9.
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anomalous. In a world without a divine designer knowing is not a correspondence but an imposition 
of form upon the objects of knowledge. Or so Nietzsche says. ^^(Emphasis added)
Then the death of the God signals a long and acrimonious quest for new secure 
foundations and stale essences from which truth can be quelled. This quest is acrimonious 
because it is based on a strenuous tension and necessitates a relentless labor to remedy or 
disguise this paradox lying at the very heart of these theories^^. In the history of truth in 
the West it was molded as an endeavor to resuscitate the understandings of God under 
different guises “by transplanting God into reason, or nature, or Spirit or the subject” '^^ . 
Yearning to sanctify a “definitive standard”, a secure home in these categories that could 
afford to shoulder the ta.sk of propping up a meaningful existence in the world, by 
procuring a direction to it, by procuring a reason to live and complacently bear the agony 
of death in the face of the death of God culminated in modern grand (or master) 
narratives. Modern thinkers and thus the modern discourse tried to create its own God 
that infers meaning upon the world. This new God, engrained as the foundation, is the 
purveyor of the key to Truth’, such as reason or particular methodologies such as 
positivism/empiricism. So the ‘external source’ that defines true knowledge, that 
differentiates it from false, is immersed in
“..God (or when that becomes incredible) in the dictates of universal reason, or the light of nature, or 
the contractual agreement of rational individuals, or the consensus of virtuous citizens, or the 
categories of a transcendental subject or the telos of histoty.”^^
The will of the ‘external source’ is materialized in logos (a unitary sovereign identity).
This first move required and activated the second desire that the world upon which a





would be transformed in a way dictated by the foundations of truth that reveals hidden 
essences.
Thus external source stipulated a teleological understanding of life or history that 
is underlined by transcendence albeit it vividly suffers from a lack of secure basis. This 
external source, in the service of Logos, endowed it with the superior term as a "higher 
presence”^^ . Just as the God and understanding of creation provided a basis for 
understanding and giving meaning to the world, this logos signifying “a “priority” seen as 
simple, intact, normal, pure, standard, self-identical”^^  offered the basis to comprehend 
the world, to give meaning to it, by transplanting its understandings into the 
identity/difference axis.
By this account of modern history of truth in the West, it becomes apparent that 
modernity is imbued with a will to tyrannize in the sense of imposing a form on the world 
through a logocentric strategy to turn to a “pure origin” that enables hierarchization 
favoring logos or identity. Reading modernity in this sense and “giving up of this eternal 
quest for a return to Eden” is the common ground for postmodernist/poststructuralist 
approaches. Giving up of this relentless quest, in more explicit terms, represents a 
wholesale assail on the
“foundiitionalism and essentialism of post-Enligliteimient scientific philosophy, its imiversalist 
presuppositions about modem rational man, its hidden metaphysics, its metatlicoretical commitment 
to dualized categories of meaning and understanding, its logocentric strategies of identity and 
liierarcliization, its theorized propositions about hmnan nature, its doginatic faith in method, its 
pliilosophics of intention and consciousness, and its tendency toward grand theory and the 
implications of its imposition.”"*
ibid., p.l3.
Jonathan Culler, cited in, Sankaran Krishna, “Tlie Importance of Being Ironic” A Post Colonial View on 
Critical International Relations Theory”, (Review Essay), AUemativesyoV. 18 (1993), p.385. 
ibid., p.386.
"*Jim George and David Campbell, “Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social 
Theory and International Relations”, International studies Quarterly (1990) 34, p.280.
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This comprehensive’ interrogation is underlined by a rejection of the “narrative 
disposition of epistemic realism”^^  which presumes a ‘reality’ and knowledge of it^ ° 
independent of discursive effects of represantation and interpretation. There is not a 
predesigned world as a harmonious unity having an essence to be discovered and a 
predesigned subject as the knower having capacity to comprehend it. Thus, what remains 
is life in the world, not preordained or consecrated to be organized in a certain 
predetermined way, but both ceaselessly tried to be organized and is itself organizing 
contingently and arbitrarily by the power plays. Hence there is always a resistance to this 
arbitrary imposition of form upon form^*.
When will to power is defined as the will to impose a form on life, knowledge^^ is 
revealed as a distinctive tool or form of power^^ neither exterior nor identical to power^“*. 
Knowledge as a tool and form of power made its impact on the humanities and social 
sciences as it abandoned the artificial boundaries between theory (or act of theorizing) 
and practice, and dispensed with the locus of theorizing high in the skies as a neutral act 
of understanding the world. The act of theorizing is both constrained and constraining, 
and enabling in that it occurs as a tool of imposing a particular interpretation on the world 
or affirming such an interpretation of it.
^^David Campbell, Politics Witliout Principle: SovcrciaiUv. litliic.s. and the Narnitives of the Gulf War. 
Critical Perspectives on World Politics Series, (Boulder- London;Lynne Rieiuier Publishers, 1993), pp. 7-8.
Coimolly, op. cit., note 14, epitomised this process as consisting of six stages that commenced with 
Platonism and culminated in the “abolition of the apparent world” that ensues the abolition of tlie “real 
world” and Iience in a new conception of knowledge.(pp., 141-4)
Winimn E. Connolly, The Terms of Political D!.scoun;c, 3“' Edition, (O.xford UK Cambridge USA; 
Blackwell, 1993), Preface to the Third Edition.
See Aytekin Yılımız, Modemden Postmoderne Siyasal Arayışlar, pp. 124-126, for a brief review of 
different conceptions of knowledge and reality.
Connolly, op. cit., note 14, p.l44.
’■^ Tom Keenan, “The “Paradox” of Knowledge and Power: Reading Foucault on a Bias”, Political Theory, 
Vol. 15 No 1 (Feb 1987), pp. 5-37.
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Where the concept of knowledge-power comes to forefront, probably the most
(in)famous concept of the postmodernist lexicon, ‘discourse’, simultaneously erupts as an
indispensable part of analysis. As opposed to the positivist conceptions of reality,
postmodernism conceptualizes “social existence as human practice” and tries to find out
how power exercised through its production and reflection. Language that is socially
structured^^ and preceding the social agent, provides the structures within which subject
is constructed, through which s/he understands and reflects the social life. Language as “a
form of life”, is “inseparable from the necessarily social construction of that reality” *^’.
By a broader definition of the “language” we reach to the definition of discourse;
“In Foucault’s terms, discourses are much more than linguistic performances; they are also plays of 
power wliich mobilize rules, codes and procedures to assert a particular understanding, througli the 
construction of knowledge within these rules, codes and procedures. Because they organize reality 
m specific ways that involve particular epistemological claims, tliey provide legitimacy, and indeed 
provide the intellectual conditions of possibility of particular institutional and political 
arrangements. Tire rules, governing practices, often implicit and not clearly articulated. But 
understood subconsciously by practitioners, are socially constructed in specific contexts.”^^ )
Thus, it is concisely epitomized that there is no transcendental reality outside the 
discourse^ **. There is a material world and a plethora of events within it but facts does not 
speak for themselves, they must be interpreted so as to be understood. Discourses are 
embedded within power relations and hence produce political knowledge^^. The process 
of othering is inherent to the discursive practices that structure social practices, impose 
particular articulations of the reality and offer a circumscribed portfolio of possibilities 
for change. Discursive practices, being intrinsically sovereign practices, defines its object 
about which knowledge would be derived (be it the neighbor country, the distant Oriental
'■’Simon Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War- I he discourse of Politics. (London: Printer l-’ublishers. 
New York: Guilford Publications, 1990), p.5.
George and Campbell, op. cit., note 28, p.273.
^^Simon Dalby, “Geopolitical Discourse” The Soviet Union As 0\\\cr", Alternatives, Vol:13 No:4 (1988), 
p.416.
“ Campbell, op. cit., note 29, p.8.
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or the pagan natives of America), determines how this knowledge would be derived, and 
differentiates normal from abnormal, civilized from barbarian, legitimate from 
illegitimate, moral from immoral. In this sense they have an ideological function in 
obscuring power relations, procuring legitimacy, naturalizing temporal conditions, and 
standing against change'*®. By this ideological function discursive practices buttress 
hegemonic “political and ideological structures”'**.
The knowledge-power problematic constitutes probably the most significant and 
illustrative differences between Critical Theory of Frankfurt School and post 
modernism/poststructuralism'*^. Although the Critical Theory, especially its Habermasian 
version affirmed power-knowledge relation by the knowledge constitutive interests'*®, it 
differs radically from postmodernist/poststructuralist stances as it tries to provide another 
basis to liberate knowledge and consciousness of people from technical or practical 
intereists which are imbued with enabling tendencies to tyrannize. Emancipatoiy interests, 
upon which the liberatory “process of self-understanding” and “self-reflection” could 
yield a critique of the existing social order, Habermasian Critical Theoiy asserts, pave the 
way for the realization of the previously tempered human potentialities through 
communicative rationality'*'*. Postmodernism reads this grand project for universalistic 
emancipation through communicative rationality as a yearning for the realization of “in 
practical political terms what traditional theory only contemplates”'*® by its insistent quest
Dalby, op. cit., note 35, p.6. 
ibid., p.8.
’’ ibid., p. to.
George and Campbell, op. cit, note 28, pp. 280-1.
HOFFMAN, Mark, “Critical Tlicory and the Interpiiradigm Debate”, in Hough C. Dyer and Leon 
Mangasarion (eds.). The Study of the International Relations: The State of the Art. (London; Macmillan, 
1989),pp. 64-7.
Ibid., p.69.
George and Campbell, op. cit, note 28, pp. 280-1.
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for a “pristine state” *^^. This stance of the Critical theorists is in striking contrast to the 
postmodernism’s abandonment of the quest for ‘reality’ or ‘absolute truth’.
2.2.2. “Death of the Subject”
This endeavor of poststructuralism that can be coined by the term politics of 
representation or epistemology entails on the other hand, interrogation of “the historical 
embodiment of humanism’s grand ambitions- the author”'*^ . Death of the author or death 
of the subject signifies an expansion of the politics of epistemology and its premises over 
the visions of modern man as a skepticism that problematizes “man’s position as the 
centered origin and source, as well as the subject, of representation”'***. This vision of the 
subject or the author is embedded within the two ideological narratives of modernity -  
humanism and logocentricism'* .^
Humanism deploys the human with an essence, with an irreducible core of the 
human. The assumption that the human being is endowed with certain ethical notions or 
capacities that has been coded into their defaults or transcendental nature is the remnant 
of the belief in creation. This nature or essence is presumed to be brought out and hence 
tamed through “self-knowledge” or “self-consciousness” and consequently the human 
being can become “more unified and coherent in the sense that its desires, purposes and 
principles increasingly assume the shape of a unified whole” °^.
Ideation of the human being in this way as a unified and coherent entity implies 
the internalization process of the power plays that try to impose a form on life, hence, on
AG Krishna, op. cit. note 26, p.386. 
Wakefield, op. cit. note 24.
ibid., p.24. 
ibid.
Connolly, op. cit. note 14, p.l47.
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the human being. This internalization process posits a social compulsion to the 
individual. The quest for self-knowledge produces a unified and coherent entity in accord 
with the requirements of modernity through an ongoing struggle^'. The subject, not as a 
given and later discovered reality, but as a construction, is the subject of genealogy. This 
genealogy has the aim of replacing essentiality with contingency, destabilizing 
established subjectivities^^ and by giving an intersubjective character to subjectivity^^ it 
tries to alter the relation between identity/difference that exhibits the logocentricism of 
Western thinking.
“The alienated subject of modemism lias been radically displaced from his or her position as 
founder of meaning. Representations (be they of the author or of the subject that the author wishes 
to (re)prescnt) can no longer be tested against tire real, as the real is itself constituted as everyday 
common-sense reality, in representations. In tliis sense, the metaphysics of modernism are no loner 
tenable. Distinctions between false consciousness and by impheation ‘true’ consciousness and 
between the self and tlie ‘other’ are no longer available within tlie terms of a poststnicturalist 
critique that jettisons the notion tliat there is any essential self preceding the social construction of 
the self
Where there is no irreducible human essence before social production or where 
the human being becomes an incomplete animal before social production, postmodernism 
makes one of its significant contributions to social theory by shaking our assumptions 
about the cultural production and subjectivity by discarding the secondary position that 
has been assigned to culture in the analysis of the social reality. It elicits a space where 
cultural traits could be causal in themselves instead of being determined by a one way 
relation between infrastructure and superstructure. This issue would be handled again
Ibid., pp.l47-5u. Here Comiolly rclcrs lo an ontology of resistance which can be seen as liic answer to 
the question of Habermas, “Wliy to fight?”. There is always a resistance against the imposition of form on 
life and human who is seen as an incomplete animal before it is socialised. And this resistance, not any kind 
of universal nonn or value that calls for figlit against the hegemonic dictates of modernity (1988:160-1) 
ibid., pp. 162-4.
Yihnaz, op. cit. note 32, p. 124.
Wakefield, op. cit, note 1, p.29.
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within the critique of postmodernism, especially while we are considering the resentment 
of postcolonial writers.
2.2.3. Sovereign Claims to Identity: A Ne)v Lease of Life for the “Other”
This problematic of identity/difference, which is initiated by the exposition of relational 
and constructed character of identity and a quest for a different demonstration of the 
power within the context of identity/difference^^, constitutes the backbone of the 
normative or democratizing concerns of the postmodernist approaches which has a 
special intimacy to the study of international relations. Anti-essentialist conception of 
identity underlines the politics of identity/difference and its intimacy to conventional 
ethical philosophy.
Following Connolly, we can commence our analysis of the identity/difference 
problem and the evil residing in it, by defining two interrelated problems. The first 
problem is the endeavour to construct the purity and decisiveness of identity. To give a 
meaning to life, a secure identity must be consiructed and the difference must be 
externalised so that such a meaning could be conferred upon the self and the world 
around it by organising the subject. For this endeavour itself is based on a tension and, as 
in the every play of power, greeted with resistance, then the second problem of evil 
comes with this hegemonic practice of sanctifying the identity as natural and universal. In 
other words it tries to delineate an arbitrary boundary and desires it to be uncontested, 
where it could never be so. The second evil, as a result, endeavours to enchant this 
tension and safeguard the identity. Tins tension can be depressed by eonsirueting die
^^WiIIiam E. Connolly, Kimlik ve Farklılık- Siva.setin Acınazlanna Dair Demokratik Cö/.iim Ûnerilcri. 
trans, by Ferma Lekesizalm(rstanbul: Ayrinti Yayınları, 1995),p.9.
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“other”^^  that materializes the difference, and difference in turn signifies a kind of 
perversion. The “self’ and the “other”, both constructed simultaneously and relational, 
reflected the power relation between the two. Subject, whether it be an individual or a 
state, is constructed in the domain of “the interhuman” through “the interrelationship of 
ethics, subjectivity, and responsibility” ’^. There is no being prior to that relation between 
the Self and the Other^ .^
Thus, the perception and conception of “other” is integral to the discursive and 
historical construction of identity as a sovereign subject.^^ As self and identity is 
constructed as a unitary, coherent body, so is the “other”. Whereas identity that is “us” is 
set as a sovereign universal norm and as a center according to which the “other” is 
evaluated (or devaluated) and the other is also constructed as the mirror image of “us”. 
The most relevant example of such an identity construction and process of othering 
integral to it, is the discourse of Orientalism, that locates the West and Western subject as 
the dominant universal norm and as a center'^ '^  which we will later dwell on in detail.
^ i^bid., p. 14-23. The first problem is the endeavour to answer the injustice of life such as the agony and 
incoinprehensiveness of death that are imbedded within tlie existential vulnerability of the human. This 
point which is resolved by the belief in the duality or fissure of the Holy being, was a point where 
Christianity set itself as a hegemonic identity, the complete rejection and condemnation of Manism as a 
blasphemy served this end. For this end the concept of resiwnsibility and will must be invoked and the 
basis must be e.xonerated from any entanglement with this responsibility as in the case of God creating 
everything but not the evil on the world that leads to the agony and pain of the human and condemnation of 
tlie first sin as lire source of it. Then a great fissure is underlined by this account between Manism and 
Cliristianity. As tlie aggrandisement of such a distancing is not without its tensions and internal conflicts, 
this first move of constructing identity in relation to identity, requires the second. Tire second move, which 
is however simultaneous to the first designed to suppress these tensions within the identity by creating an 
“other”.
57David Campbell, “Political Prosaics, Transversal Politics, and the Anarcliical World” in Michael J.
Shapiro and Hayv/ard R. Alkcr (cda.), Chal!cn;dna Roundaiic:;: Globa! FIü^ ·^s, Tcrntorial identities. VoI;2, 
(Minneapolis-London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996),p. 131.
ibid., 133.
Keyinaii, op. cit. note 10, p.72.
Fuat Key man, Mahmut Mutman, Meyda Ycgcnoglu, “Giriş: “Dünya” Nasıl Dünya Oldu?” in Fuat 
Kcyman, Mahmut Mutman, Meyda Yeğenoğlu(eds.), Oryantalizm, HcRcmonva ve Kültürel Fark, (İstanbul: 
İletişim Yayınlan, 1996),p.9.
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However, it must be reiterated that neither the self nor the “other” is totally inert 
entity that has been determined once and for all. Instead what the identity/difference 
problematic defines is rather an active practice of constructing borders, determining 
centers and locating the periphery, and giving the sense of staleness both to the identity 
and difference^\ In this sense it directly refers to the mechanisms of inclusion and 
exclusion. Here difference is located within a scheme of oppositional dichotomies that 
inevitably informs a hierarchization. Difference is represented within this ready-made 
scheme that enjoys secure foundations and essentials cultivated within an elaborate and 
complex power/knowledge device, that is the hegemonic discourse. Hierarchization 
assumes those attributes assigned to the identity (or logo) is superior, according to the 
foundations and essentials taken to be universal evaluative ciileiia. As the evaluative 
criteria are deducted from the special experience of the sovereign self, its practices and 
power relations, the evaluative criteria match with the constructed essence that is 
imposed on the sovereign self as identity. Thus most of the time the “other” is 
represented by the lack of appraisive attributes inherent to "us”^^ . The formation and 
stabilization of identity requires the construction and distancing of the “other”. The 
distancing of ‘other’, creating the interval between the Self and Other opens the space 
“where being is being realised” ’^^ . Thus, as “us” is idealized, the “other” is also totalized 
and reduced to an essence with a double move of centering of the logo and othering of 
the difference.
''’Mahnnit Mulnian, 'Under the Sign of Orientalism: The West vs Islam”, Cultural Critique, Vol:23 
(Winter, 1992-93), p. 172..
'’"Keyman, et. al., op. cit. note 60, pp. 10-1.
Campbell, op. oil note 55, p.l33.
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In international relations, where to understand the “other” has a vital importance, 
this process of othering has more profound and striking effects. Conventional 
international relations theories, molded within a western originated rationalist universalist 
perspective aggravate the problematic of identity difference and leave no space for the 
other to be represented within their ownership of their own histoiy and culture '^*. This 
denial and neglect of the other cultures is underlined by a specific conception of culture 
and community, which in turn dovetail each other.
The process of othering and hierarchization of alien cultures is underlined by a 
particular definition of culture that holds it to be common values and meanings 
constructed in time through interaction of separate subjects. For these theories reduced 
the “other” to an empiric and cultural entity, as they conceive culture as an ontological 
existence, neglecting its intersubjectively constructed nature and underlying the allegedly 
objective and neutral knowledge derived by the sovereign subject of knowledge as the 
essence of these ontological entities. This theoretical attitude toward other cultures is 
characterized by “I-it relationship” to the “other” in which “one knows and uses other 
persons or things without allowing them to exist for oneself in their uniqueness”*'^  The 
interrogation of this relation and endeavor to give a lease of life for other modes of 
relations has a significant resonance in the recent critical literature.
In contrast to conventional approaches to culture, poststructuralist approaches 
define culture as an ideological/discursive practice through which meanings and values 
are constructed and exchanged within a given space^ *". For meaning is always relational
Keynian, op. cit. note 10, p.72.
“  Campbell, op. cit. note 55, p. 133.
66 Keyinan, op. cit. note 10, pp.76-9
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and signifies a relation based on difference as we have mentioned in the case of 
construction of the self as a subject having a unitary identity that inexorably requires and 
invokes the “other”, the identity/difference axis becomes fundamental in 
deconstructionist/genealogical strategies for the purpose of creating an ethical space for 
the self representation of other.
Moreover, this understanding of culture in turn entails a different understanding 
of community contending the “ahistorical and monistic interpretation” of it. Community, 
particularly the international community, as relational and historical, can be conceived as 
“a never completed product of multiple historical practices, a still-contested product of 
struggle to impose interpretation upon interpretation”^^ . The main difference between the 
two conceptions of community is that whereas in the first one identity is taken for granted 
as an essential, in the second definition identity is understood to be a state of sovereign 
subject that has been yielded from the relation between self and the “other”.
Another inclination of the conventional international relations theories that is 
complicit in this denial and neglect of other cultures is the hypocritical eschewal of 
cultural elements. Whereas realist or neorealist approaches deny attributing any causal 
significance to cultural matters, other approaches having neo-Marxist leanings, like 
Dependencia or Modern World System theories attribute a secondary role to culture. 
Their attitude toward culture is hypocritical in the sense they are based on premises
ibid., pp.79-80.
^^Richard K. Asliley, “The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of
Inteniatioiuil Politics”, yl/iernot/vei·, Vol;12 (1987), p.406.
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rooted in Western cultural traditions*'  ^ and disguise such a commitment to particularistic 
cultural values under the velvet of universals.
Winfred L. Amaturo^® highlights the grave consequences of this neglect. Not only 
the international relations theory, but the emergence, expansion and consolidation of the 
international system^  ^ and its workings have cultural underpinnings. Although there is a 
wide range of agreement on the point that “the international system came into being 
through the expansion of the Western European states system”^^ , the great cultural 
worldwide transformations it has entailed and the particular role played by culture is 
ignored. Amaturo claims that to get a more complete picture of social reality, the cultural 
component must be added to our analysis. A reservation that must be posited to 
Amaturo’s suggestion is that, this requirement erupts not because social reality is 
interdependent but because reality is social. Hard realities of guns and money are 
meaningful in a social context and this meaning is constituted and transmitted through 
rhetoric and image.
2.3. Contribution of Postmodernism: Critique and Redeployment
By these challenges posed to the conventional understandings of modernity, modern 
identity, and a wide variety of related concepts such as community, sovereign subject of
'^■^ Nick J. Rengger, “Incommensurability, International Tlieory and the Fragmentation of Western Political 
Culture” in J. R. Gibbins (ed), Contemporary Political Culture: Politics in a Post modem Age, (London; 
Sage, 1989), p.235.
'"Winifred L. Ajnaturo, “Literatme and International Relations: tlic Question of Culture”, Milleimium: 
Journal of liniernalional Relations, (Spring 1995, Vol. 24, No. 1)
See Medley Bull, “The Emergence of a Universal International Society”, in H. Bull and A. Watson (eds.). 
The Expansion of International Society (Oxford; Clarondon Press, 1984) for an account of the emergence 




knowledge, postmodernism/poststmcturalism open the gates of international relations to a 
critical inquiry
“ ... one that would refuse the dichotomies of identity and difference, surface and depth. It would not 
pretend to an “apocalyptic objectivity”, a totalizing standpoint outside of time and capable of 
enclosing all history witliin a singular narrative, a law of development, or a vision of progress
toward a certain end of humankind The appropriate posture is disposed to a view very much akin
to that of Michel Foucault’s genealogical attitude: “a form of history which accounts for the 
constitution of knowledge, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to refer to a subject, 
whether it be transcendental in relation to the field of events or whether it chase its empty identity 
tlirougliout Mstoiy.... Tliere are no constants, no fixed meanings, no secure gromids, no profound 
secrets, no final structures or limits of liistory. Seen from afar, there is only interpretation, and 
interpretation itself is comprehended as a practice of domination occurring on the surface of history 
(Foucault, 1977:150). History itself is grasped as a series of interpretations imposed upon 
interpretations - none primary, all arbitrary.””
The postmodernist/poststructuralist approaches signify important contributions to the 
social sciences and International Relations by their critique of modernity and its gospels 
such as scientific thinking, positivism/empiricism, rationalism, etc., and particularly by 
its endeavor to create an ethical space for the “other” to represent itself The critical turn 
in international relations, in general, ameliorates the tensions and despair of 'yesterday’s 
crisis’ and gives a dynamism to the field. It has procured a thinking space for the cultural 
production of subjects by shaking the orthodoxy of scientific methodology which has 
assumed no realities beyond its confines.
“In the postmodernist contribution to International Relations, consequently, there has emerged an 
alternative way of understanding and articulating reality, one focused on intertextuality and socio- 
Imguistic discursive practice, rather than monological literary convention and positivist objectivism 
and foundationalism. Whatever else this alternative approach achieves, it problematizes the 
dominant International Relations commitment to a world of given subjects and objects, and all other 
dichotomised givens. In so doing it reformulates basic questions of neorealist understanding in 
emphasising not the sovereign subject (e.g., author/independent state) and/or tire object (e.g., 
independent world/text) but, instead, the lustorical, cultural, and linguistic practices in wliich 
subjects and objects (and theory and practice, facts and values) are constructed.””
Its stimulating effect is probably the most appreciated one in different circles, 
even among the most austere main stream scholars. Nevertheless there are a wide variety
^Richard K. Ashley, op. cit. note 63, pp.408-9. 
George, op. ciL note 9, p.59.
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of criticisms to it that must be mentioned here to set our theoretical perspective. These 
critiques vary on a wide spectrum. One main classification, however, can be made 
according to the attitude of the critiques. In the first category we can mention those who 
consider themselves as the representative of the mainstream approaches, or in more 
explicit terms as the defenders of modernity and children of Enlightenment. These 
critiques try either to dismiss postmodernism or to amalgamate it into rationalistic 
approaches by reducing it into a stimulating critique. On the second category, those who 
are sympathetic to post modernism and do not try to abrogate it but resenting to its 
inadequacies at different points can be counted. Within theory we will make a distinction 
between those who try to merge Critical Theoiy and postmodernism and those who warn 
against the logocentric biases of postmodernism.
2.3.1. First Group: Postmodernism, Dismissed!
Critiques in the first group mainly focus on the lack of an empirical research program, 
eschewal of tkccry construction on the part of postmodernists and the threat of being lost 
in an endless chain of deconstruction and destructive nihilism.’  ^ As we have mentioned 
this in the first chapter we would not dwell on this group again, however the point that 
these critiques are often underlined by misreading and misunderstanding of 
postmodernism, which is not totally innocent must be reiterated here. These criticisms are 
imbued with “common metaphors” and given direction by their “aesthetics” that “frame 
possible responses, to impose parameters on what these works...must be heard to say and
75 See Chapter One 1.
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mean.” '^' This strategic move involves a debilitating reductionism as it tries to enclose 
postmodernism as a set of positions despite its richness of variegated postures. It creates a 
stereotype of postmodernism by taking an example text within it as symptomatic of it’ .^
The main reservations of these critiques to postmodernism cemented around the 
“warnings against impending nihilism”^^  which refers to anti-foundationalist and anti- 
essentialist stances of postmodernists, albeit in a totalized and caricatured manner. The 
claim is that postmodernism greets every statement with a question mark, turns every 
method to reach knowledge into a power play, mutates knowledge to unknowable and 
thus makes any kind of qualitative judgement impossible and thus it reaches to the point 
“anything goes”. This line of argument generally concludes that its enthusiasm for 
metanarrative interrogation make no venerable contribution to the progress of 
knowledge^^. These critiques holding conventional visions of modernity, science (main 
aim of science is to reach useful and true knowledge), knowledge, methodology and so 
on which poststructuralists are refusing to accept, and generally without mentioning the 
contention on the part of so-called postmodernists against these conceptions and 
eschewing to directly referring these challenges, try to evaluate the achievements of 
poststructuralists by the criteria that poststmcturalists are already challenging.
Habermas*” provides a different example among the sharpest critiques of 
postmodernism who tries to dismiss it as “degenerative and reactionary paths taken by
^*^ Richard K. Ashley, R. B. J. Walker, “CONCLUSION- Reading Dissideiice/ Writing the Discipline; Crisis 
and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies”, International Studies Quarterly, Special Issue, 
Vol. 34, No.3, September 1990b, pp.36S 75.
”  Butler, op. cit note 8, p.249-50.
ibid., p.248.
See Stephen Eric Bronner, “Introduction” (1997; 10-11) and Winfred L. Amaturo 1995.
Mark Poster in his book Critical Tlreorv and Poststructuralism- In Search of a Context, where he tries to 
create a rapprochement between these two main strands of critical approaches, asserts his alignment to 
Critical theory. However, he provides a stimulating critique of the Frankfurt School and especially its
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French intellectuals”*^'. The striking point is that Habermas through his critique of
postmodernism revised his own stance against the Enlightenment reason and by an
inadequate move tries to appropriate the poststructuralists perspective rooted in language
theory to compensate the weaknesses of his theory with this respect. Habermas’ yearning
for a Critical Theory that promotes emancipation (emancipation here is defined as
“achievement of rational autonomy” in a Weberian sense) tries to formulate a new theory
of truth distant from that of positivism or hermeneutics. He made a distinction between
instrumental and communicative rationality
“Communicative rationality, in Habermas’s \ iew, is not subject to the poststructuralist critique of 
reason. Only instrumental reason supports domination and is therefore open to the poststructuralist 
objection. Communicative rationality requires a democratic conte.xt in winch anyone may question 
the argumentative claims of one else, so long each party aims at consensus and agrees to concur 
with positions tliat he or she cannot refute”*“
However, what Habermas has defended as the essence of enlightenment under the 
rubric of reason, is something pertinent to western history providing a secure basis for 
sovereign practices of inclusion and exclusion. In Poster’s words, “he universalises the 
particular, grounds the conditional, absolutizes the finite.”^^ . This new foundation is a 
rational consensus that can be reached in an “ideal speech situation” through free 
argumentation* '^'. First, he privileges rationality, albeit specified and distinguished as 
communicative reason, as the basis of any kind of emancipatory project. Ignoring the 
exclusionary practices embedded in science that assume male rational western subjects 
and invalidates “culturally determined subjects”, he exonerated it of any entanglement
Habermasian strand. Moreover. Poster provides an outstanding account of llie dialogue betw een Frankfurt 
Critical riieory and poststnicturalism.
*'David Ashley, “Habermas and the Completion of the Project of Modernity” in Biyan S. Turner (ed.), 
Tlicorics of Modernity and Post modcniitv. (London-Ncwburg Park-New Delhi: SAGE Publications,
1990), pp. 89-90.
*■ Mark Poster, op. cit note 8, p.2.1.
*^  ibid.. 22.
.^ .1
with oppression of women and minorities, or “the other”. Reason postulated as a 
transcendental universal principle marks a return to the logocentric and foundationalist 
philosophies of Enlightenment where he just tries to escape its domination. Secondly, 
Habermas assumes the possibility of “complete transparency” in inter-personal relations 
contrary to the “essential ambiguity of inter-personal relations”.**^ Thirdly, the 
commitment to a rational consensus might be commensurate to the commitment to the 
elimination of difference, and equality of identity with reservation of amalgamating and 
homogenising each in the consensual agreement gradually.
2.3.2, Second Group: A Promiscuous Marriase Behveen Critical Theory and 
Postmodernism
Beside the idea of dismissing postmodernism as an unworkable theoretical stuff, there is 
one more group of writers that implicitly confers the critiques of postmodernism with 
respect to its anti-foundationalism and anti-essentialism but instead of declaring it 
absolute, iiics lu icune it. Ironically in this vein we can enumerate writers who are 
generally disciples of Habermas. They appreciate the merits of poststructuralist stances in 
contesting “political concepts of sovereignty, identity and difference”**^ and try to make 
an agenda of agreement within the critical front.**^  Nevertheless, they try to find a solution 
to the paradox of anti-foundationalism
Chris Brown, “ ‘Turlies All Ihe Way Down’: Anli-Foundationalisni, Critical Tlieory and International 
Rdal\or\s'\ .\filleimium: Journal o f International Studies, Vol. 23 No 2 (1994), pp.218-9 
ibid.,p.221.
Dcvclak, op. cit, note 132, pp.41-46.
See Da\'id Ashley , “Habermas and the Completion of the Project of Modernity” (1990).for an c.xample 
of cndea\'Our to delineate a common ground between Habermasian critical Theoiy and poslmodemism.
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For example Richard Devetak** tries to stick to an ideal of enlightenment which 
he argues is the spirit of modernity and may offer a basis for a critical social theory. 
However, his posture poses the risk of elevating another essential in the name of 
emancipation and defies the very spirit of postmodernism by sanctifying the so-called 
project of modernity as a transcendental universal ideal that can be hold by all the human 
kind.
Another example can be given from Andrew Linklater, who makes it clear from 
the outset that he assumes the vantage point of Frankfurt School but Critical Theory has 
to be articulated more fully to offer a base for the next stage. Linklater’s proposal^^ is to 
conceal “Foucault’s analysis of systems of exclusion” and “Habermas’s aim of bringing 
patterns of moral and cultural learning within a new critical theory”. Underlying the 
systems of inclusion and exclusion as a universal phenomenon that has an inexplicable 
role in the molding of every society, Linklater tries to find a normative basis to choose 
among them^ *^ . He goes on by determining universal and trying to find ways to cluster 
different approaches to international relations to mould a common intellectual enterprise 
as a way to the rationalization process. However, with his unharrased eclecticism, 
Linklater brings forth the danger of intransigent intellectual foreclosure by trying to 
provide an all-encompassing explanation of international relations once and for all. 
Moreover, he reiterated the Habermasian yearnings to find emancipatory universal
Here Devetak makes a distinction between postinodcmism and poststnicturalisin. And he emphasises that 
poststructuralism is neither for nor against the project of modernity. By his interpretation of project of 
modernity, which is an idealisation of intentions of enlightenment and elevating these intentions to 
trairsccndcnlal fcimdations i:'. an aliislorical ¡uaimcr, he implies lliat po.st mocleiuism or the uadcistanding 
of “a socio-cultural condition, or period following modernity” is a result of misreading modernity. 
‘’^ Linklater, op. cit note 12. Also see Mark Hoffman, “Restructuring, Reconstniction, Réinscription, 
Reartuculation: Four Voices in Critical Intemational Theory” Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, 
Vol:20 No:2 (1991), 169-185. for a review of Linklatcr’s proposal for the next stage in his book Beyond 
Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations. (London: Macmillan, 1990)
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elements within the mo■demity^  ^ So these endeavors to give an answer to the question of 
how one can judge in the dearth of universal morals that enables one to choose, informed 
by Critical Theory is discarded as it reiterates the insidious universalistic, logocentric 
tendencies of it.
Still this paradox of anti-foundationalism or in other words the total effect of, 
“power-knowledge”, “death of subject”, and denunciation of universals and the need for a 
base to choose among different alternatives and to take political action is in need of 
rearticulation for our purposes in this thesis. Tom Keenan^^, has epitomized the 
contentions of three important critiques of Foucault- Habermas, Nancy Fraser and 
Charles Taylor, on the point of “power-knowledge” as the interrogation of the normative 
basis of Foucaultian politics. This challenge was raised by one simple question of “Why 
fight?”. Where the right for resistance resides in, if there is nothing behind surface, no 
essence or foundation that can confer upon us such a right? How and why we try to 
subvert power as domination when there is no truth outside of regimes of truth and these 
regimes were intertwined with the exercise of power? If “participating in struggles 
certainly involves knowledge, where the content of the knowledge does not validate the 
struggle”^^ , how one claim right to struggle? As Campbell succinctly epitomized; “the 
ground for moral theory has been removed once the logos of metaphysics has gone” '^'. 
This is the paradox underlined by these critiques.
ibid., p.8.3.
^'Mark Hoffman, “Rcstnicturing, Reconstruction, Réinscription, Rearticulation: Four Voices in Critical 
International Theory”, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Vol:20 No;2 (1991), p.l73.
Keenan, op. cit note 34.
”  ibid., p.7.
Campbell, op. cit. note 29, p.91.
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In theory it can be answered through highly complex “technical, terminological 
measure”^^ , however, in politics the only answer that can be offered is that in politics the 
terms that have been interrogated such as right (to speak, to act, to struggle), ration or 
knowledge are indispensable. But this indispensability does not justify their essentializing 
or universalizing. They are displaced and temporalised so as to prevent a foreclosure in 
their name^ .^ And a more viable answer to this paradox can be found in the replies of so- 
called postmodernists and their postcolonialist critiques. First of all, I would like to 
underline that I would not ascribe to “a utopian epistemological vantage point” as Mark 
Poster has pointed out;
“Many American poststructuralists, especially decon.structionists, appear to believe tliat a political 
position and a social tlieory are built into their interpretive strategy. If one avoids closure and titaliin 
ones own discourse, tliey contend, if one unsettles, destabilizes, and complicates the discourses of 
humanities, if one resists taking a stance of binary opposition in relation to the position one is 
criticizing, one has thereby instantiated a nomepressive politics”^^ .
It is apparent that sovereign practices, insidious plays of power, or imposed 
subjectivities can not be overcome by simply mentioning them, or by trying to develop 
sensitivity against them. The aim is not to deconstruct the hegemonic discourses once and 
for all to uncover some kind of eternal truth or a final subjectivity, or to reach a 
consensus and amalgamate all differences. Rather the aim is to create an ethical space for 
the excluded and marginalized subjects to speak, to accept the other as being other. My 
inclinations in this thesis are towards something like the “celebratory” attitude defined by 
Lapid that is informed by Connolly’s urge to initiate theory construction. However, as to 
claim a status for my self beyond any subjectivities is not possible, the “contingent and
Keenan, op. cit. note 34, p.28. 
ibid., p.29.
Poster, op. cit. note 8, p.9.
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contextual essentialism”^^  seems as an appropriate way. Campbell provides an eloquent 
example of this stance by defining ethics bound to subjectivity and its being linked to 
other. According to his concept of “radical interdependence” that takes not only 
increasing material interactions between states but which emphasizes the intimate relation 
of “the fundamental situation of a subjects being-in-the-world” with the other and hence 
sets this subjectivity as something that must be “politically contested and negotiated”^^ .
2.3.3. Third Group: Postmodernism Sensitized to Eurocentricism
Although postmodernism represents itself as the most ardent advocate of democratization 
and made a great contribution with this respect it has some other inadequacies in dealing 
with the question of other. The process of othering that marginalizes the difference is 
central to the rationalist international relations theories^ *^^ . Postmodernism in international 
relations represents a resentment to the exclusionary structure of international relations 
theories'°\ It opposes the idea of the unitary modern subject and emphasizes the marginal 
sites in which the imposition of the modern unitaiy subject becomes more and more 
problematic. The idea of improving sensitivity to the difference is central to 
postmodernist approaches'®^. However, this good intention that neglects the insidious 
resistance of the conventional approaches to any attempt to shake the throne of the 
modern western (male) identity carries the risks of reinvigorating cultural essentialism 
and eurocentricism that it stood against'® .^
Krisluia, op. cit note 26, pp.405-6.
Campbell, op. cit. note 29, pp.91-9.





The first point that must be stated is that the strategy of deconstructing modernity 
by demonstrating its cultural essentialism is not commensurate to produce a non- 
eurocentric narrative of international relations or, to write or conceptualize the history of 
international relations from the perspective of the “other” "^'*. As Sankaran Krishna has 
diagnosed that the problem mainly lies in the fact that most of the postmodernist writers 
have a tendency to commence their writings “from a remarkably self-contained and self­
referential view of the West”*°^ .
The first part of this view revealed in historical analysis like Connolly has 
initiated in his book “Political Theory and Modernity”. He outlines the history of truth in 
the West and implicitly designates postmodernism as a part of it^ '^ *'. But he does not 
mention like many other postmodernist writers, “the intimate dialogue between 
“Western” and “non-Western” economies, societies, and philosophies that underwrite the 
disenchantment with modernity”’®’. This neglect can be seen also in many definitions of 
either the postmodern condition’®*, proliferating marginal sites’®® or late modern 
condition” ® which take into consideration first and fore most the conditions in the most 
developed countries but generally neglect the acrimonious experience of imperialism in 
the colonized world, the movement of decolonization, efforts of westernization that put 
into jeopardy the social texture of many non-western societies.
ibid., p.90.
KJirislina, op. cit note 26, p.388.
Connolly, op. cit. note .53. pp. 141-44.
Krishna, op. cit. notc26, p.388.
Jean-François Lyotard, “Introduction to the Postmodern Condition; A Report on Knowledge”, in 
Stephen Eric Bronner (cd.), 'rtventieth Century Political Theory; A Reader. (New York- London; 
Routledge, 1997)
' “^ Richard K. Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, “Speaking the Language Dissident of Exile; Thought in 
International Studies” International Sliulies (Juarterly Special Issue, Vol. 34, No.3, September 1990a. 
" “James DerDerian, Antidiplomacv -spies, terror. stx:ed. and war. (Cambridge&O.xford; Blaclwell,1992)
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Postmodernism with its neglect of the subjects in the rest of the world can be 
mainly the beginning point for the resistance of the western subject. Beside this 
constraint, this neglect imposes other risks of eurocentricism when neglect itself is 
neglected. The crisis of meaning involved in many definitions of the postmodern 
condition must not be universalized as the problem of everybody and the points of 
resistance must not be reduced to this one pertinent to the modern western subject**  ^
Postmodernist critique of modernity is initiated by a refusal of the humanist view and 
proceeded with a strategy based on the death of subject and in turn this strategy, that is 
based on a Western type resistance, is universalized as the only way of anti-humanist 
resistance to modernity. For example Connolly illustrates a Nietzschean ethic based on 
“ontology of resistance” -- that is “human life cannot be without the creation of the social 
form” and “every social form will engender that which resists it” ’^^ . However, one cannot 
help but ask whose resistance this is. It emphasizes one kind of resistance, that is the 
resistance of modern Western subjects, the killers of God.
Postmodernism has a tendency to neglect the historical difference between the 
Western subject and colonial subject that is rooted in the othering of the later, in other 
words it ignores the role of imperialism in the construction of the colonial subject. In 
postmodernism the resistance that is elevated as the only resistance is the resistance of the 
modern Western subject, thus, in order to prevent a foreclosure with respect to the 
different strategies, the construction of the other as the subject, in other words other 
subjects particularly the colonial subject must not be ignored. Thus postmodernism, 
despite its normative commitments to open up an ethical space for the “other” to speak.
Key man, op. cit. note 10, p.91. 
Connolly, op. eit note 14, 161.
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can assume the task of speaking in the name of the “other” just like the narratives of 
modernity it was refusing^* .^ The question of how to articulate the non-western subjects 
resistance is silenced within the postmodernist discourse. However, to speak as the other 
on its own entails not merely exposition of the cultural essentialism of modernity but to 
construct an alternative subject position.
The second problem with postmodernism can be summarized as the 
underemphasis of the material world. This problem shows up itself first in the 
overemphasis on meaning and its discursive construction on the bases of identity 
difference at the expense of the multidimensional and complex process of identity 
construction. Even if we accept that the other is constructed discursively, both discursive 
and political, economic, military factors must be taken into consideration. Postmodernism 
is inadequate to analyze the construction process of the “other”, for it has a tendency to 
conceptualize terms like power, authority and conflict as textual strategies rather than 
material pract icesAnother  area where this problem resonates related to the first is that 
being preoccupied too much with the “practices of representation and signification”, 
some postmodernist writings bring forth the danger of “losing a vital and physcalistic 
sense of the violence”’’ ,^ domination, exploitation, and the pauperization of the non-
western world 116
Kcyman, op. cit. note 10, p.92. 
ibid, p.93.
115 Saiikaran Klirislina, op. cit note 26, in her review article (with reference to the chapters related to the 
Gulf War in Der Derian’s, Anti-diplomacy: Spies. Terror. Speed and War, Michael J. Shapiro’s “Reading 
the Post-modern Polity: Political Theory as Textual Practice” and Chaloupka’s “Knowing Nukes: The 
politics and ilic L'liilurc of the Alonf) underlines the iact that postmodernist analysis of the Gulf War 
“leaves one with little sense of the annihilation visited upon the people and land of Iraq”(1993:399). We 
have expanded tliis problem of unbalanced or one sided representation of violence with overemphasis of 
the “representation, sign systems” and of “the signifier over signified” to the relations of domination and 
exploitation. This critique is not directed only to the postmodernist writers but also to many postcolonialist 
writers like Gayatri Spivak, Akeel Bilgrami and probably the most celebrated one Edward Said. These 
intellectual avant garde “brought the concerns of the hitherto marginalized {xople to the front of intellectual
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Postcolonialisfn, at this juncture, provides an efficient strategy to resolve the 
problematic in postmodernist views neglecting the different historicity of colonial culture 
and the subject positions that have been constructed historically and spatially. 
Although postcolonialism, generally utilizes postmodernist assumptions, differs from 
postmodernist approaches in that it started the deconstruction of global history of 
modernity from the non-western and colonized subject pos i t ions . I t  rejects the Third 
World ideology through which, whereas First and Second worlds defined by their internal 
traits through their own histories. Third World as a space constructed externally by 
imperialist relations denied its own history and cultural formations. Postcolonial 
critique aims to put into jeopardy what is monolithic and homogeneous in the name of 
variety, plurality and heterogeneity and aims to deconstruct the abstract, general and 
universal around the axis of the material, contingent and local. This is not to privilege 
local against universal, or internal factors as opposed to external ones, but to underline
debates” ,however, the eiTcct of poslcoloiiial theory is ambiguous. First of all it “obfuscate some of the 
enduring legacies of colonialism, including the pauperization of the Third World in the age of late 
capitalism” (Majid, 1995-1996:6).
^^^Anouar Majid, “Can the Postcolonial Critic Speak? Orientalism and the Rushdie Affair”, Cultural 
Critique (Winter 1995-96).
Key man, op. cit. note 10, p.99.
^^^bid.,p.l00.
At this point we must be alert about the “ahistorical and universalising” deployment of the 
postcolonialist discourse. As John Docker, “Rethinking Postcolonialism and Multiculturalism in tlie Fin de 
Siècle”, Cultural Studies, Vol:9 No:3 (1995), 409-426.(1995) has warned the students interested in culture, 
postcolonialism when employed as a theoretical framework, having global ambitions might lead to fatal 
reductionisms.
“.It collapses into one tenu and history very different national-racial formations, as between settler- 
colonial societies like the United States. Australia, and Canada and socir'ties like Nigeria,, .Jamaica, 
and India as together postcolonial simply because they were both colonies equates a society 
dominated by white settlers with a society composed of an ex-colonized indigenous population. 
Used in this way, ‘postcoloniaF becomes a totalizing category neutralizing geopolitical differences 
across the globe.”(Shohat, quoted in,Docker, 1995:410)
The approach in this paper borrowed from Keyman (1996b) secures the more contingent and historical 
usage of the tenu.
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the relational nature of the identity and thus to locate global history within the 
identity/difference context’^ ®.
Postcolonialism points out that any interrogation of global modernity that does 
not include both textual and historical deconstruction of the identity construction process 
carries the risk of reiterating eurocentric narratives. Secondly postcolonial critique does 
not present the criticism of humanism as the death of the subject, for political action 
requires a subject position.'^* So it tries to articulate the resistance of the non-western 
subjects. Thirdly Postcolonialism asserts that in the face of the multidimensional 
construction of identity, both the problematization of global modernity and creating 
alternative identity policies must be based on a plurality of theoretical frameworks. It 
advocates a theoretical plurality and a dialogue between these alternative frameworks’^ .^
By these traits postcolonialism provides just one of the contingent and contestable 
foundations needed for theorization and political action. The point that makes it worthy 
of appreciation is the curious balance that it established between a peculiar subjective 
position and tolerance for plurality.




CHAPTER III: A POSTMODERN OVERVIEW OF THE 
SECURITY DISCOURSES
3.1. The State of Security Studies After the Cold War
The recent critical turn in international relations, that has been allied to the wider debates 
in the social sciences and hence has an intimacy to the great alterations experienced by 
the late capitalist societies and global states system, has a momentum of itself to 
destabilise the international relations field. Nevertheless this destabilisation is further 
aggravated by the enormous changes experienced dramatically in international politics by 
the abrupt end of the Cold War. After the initial euphoria of triumphalism has abated, 
post-Cold War Era stood as a source of theoretical confusion with its dramatically altered 
circumstances, ambiguous opportunities and roaming dangers. Such considerations about 
the New World Order give stimuli for a revaluation of many issues.
Within this zeal for revaluation probably issues related to security rank high due 
to several reasons. First reason is the substantiality of the discrepancy between the 
security parameters of the Cold War and considerations arouse by the demise of it\ 
Secondly, the bold decline of the Cold War and the sheer failure of the field to anticipate 
the end of it are far more embarrassing for the field of security studies that lead to an 
accelerated resonance within the field. For it is a field that has been heavily permeated by
'Simon Dalby, “Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourses” 
Alternatives, Vol: 17 No: (1992), pp.95-7
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the Cold War thinking and furthermore claims special expertise with respect to the Cold 
War .^
After the Second World War, especially during the Golden Age of the field 
between 1955 and 1965 and its revitalisation in 1980s by the second Cold War^, the 
scope of the security studies has been narrowed. “The primacy of national security 
defined largely in military terms” is set as a premise'*. Then on “what security is, how 
important it is relative to other goals and the means by which it should be pursued” were 
not prevalent topics to be debated^. Consequently, the main concern of the security 
specialists, “the study, of the threat, use, and control of military force”  ^ dovetails this 
definition. This parochial understanding of security and the security studies, dictated by a 
closure entrenched within the circumstances of the Cold War is the main target of the 
heightened criticism.
Studies urging for alternative security frameworks, underlining the need for a 
reconceptualisation of the main anal3hical tools of the security studies, or offering new 
study guides for the field in the new era abmptly proliferated.^ Within this new
“David A. Bald^vin, “Security studies and the end of the Cold War”, World Poliiics, VoI:48 No: 1 (October 
1995), p. 132.
 ^See Steplicn M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol:35 
No: (1991), 211-239 for a review of the field of security studies that reflects the strict orthodox view.
' Ibid.,p. 126.
 ^ ibid.,pp. 123-32.
Stephen M. Walt cited in Baldwin, op.cit note 2 p. 125.
 ^ Sec Carolyn M. Stephenson, “The Need For Alternative Forms of Security: Crises and Opportunities” 
Alternatives, Vol:13 No: (1988), 55-76, for a review of arguments that “suggest the brcakdo\\n of old 
models of security and push us towards a new systcm”(55). Barry Bu/.an in his article “Peace, Po\\'cr, and 
Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations”, Journal o f Peace Research, Vol:21 
No:2 (1984), 109-25, tries to evaluate the merits of idealist and realist approaches to the security issues and 
criticising their mlarisnOoii and endeavours to offer a more ex|y'dicn( p<'rs[')crti\’e lhroiu)|i a 
reconceptualisation of ‘security’. Ken Booth, in his “Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and 
Practice”, International Affairs, Vol:67 No:3 (1991), pp.527-45, provides a challenging critique of 
incalcitratcd realist views and proposes “utilitarian realism” as a workable alternative. Honever, his too 
optimistic evaluation of the trends in world poliiics and nascent optimism as to the withering away of the 
slate does not provide the secure grounds on which a utopian re;ilist security could be formulated. Ken 
Booth and Barry Buzan’s altitudes coincide on their premature proclamation that the main referent of the
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reverberation, Barry Buzan directed a plain but highly challenging question, albeit his 
own answer received much criticism*. Security of whom? Around this plain question a 
plethora of critical voices heightens to question the existing understandings of security 
and to reformulate anew the concept with a wider scope and meaning. This debate for a 
reformulation of security has loom large over a wide variety of issues ranging from 
environmental issues to gendered politics, human rights to the problems of Third World, 
pauperisation to global inequalities and Euorcentricism.
Demand for the reformulation of security, which sometimes even amounts to a 
program to dissolve the whole prevalent discourses of security that revolve around the 
concepts of state sovereignty, military power, national interests and anarchy thematic, 
poses a serious challenge for the realist hegemony that enjoyed an omnipotent authority, 
particularly in the field of security studies. These developments have instigated a 
reassertion of the continued relevance and inevitable ascendancy of (neo)realist 
approaches within the field of security studies through a delimitation of the probable 
future horizons in which the concept of security may unfold over issues such as ecology, 
feminism and human rights just to mention a few. Reiterating the conventional meanings 
of security and proclaiming them as largely immutable, the importance and relevance of
security is individual, however stales would play a significant role as long as the tlireat of war continues, 
althougli Booth’s approach is far too optimistic compared to that of Buzan’s. Bradley S. Klein in his article 
“After Strategy: The Search for a Post-Modern Politics of Peace”, Alternatives, Vol:13 No: (1988), 293- 
318, initiated a quite ambitious task of formulatmg a postmodern security understandmg. Stephen M. 
Walt’s arguments m his widely debated article “The Renaissance of Security Studies” provides a prolific 
example of tlie orthodox response to the great alterations experienced in World politics and the consequent 
challenges directed against the security studies.
 ^ For crilicisms of Barry Buzan’s approach see Simon Dalby, 'Security, Modernity, Ecology: Ihe 
Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse”, Alternatives, Vol:17 (1992), especially pp. 100-3 and 
106, G. M. Dillon, “Modernity, Discourse and Deterrence” Current Research on Peace and Violence, 
Vol:12 No:2 (1989),p.92, Bill Mesweeney, :ldentity and Security: Buzan and the Cophenagen School”, 
Review o f International Studies, Vol:22 No:l (January 1996),81-93 and Martin Shaw, “There is no such 
thing as society: beyond individualism and statism in inteniatioiial security studies”. Review o f  
International Relations Studies, Vol:19 No:2 (April 1993), pp.161-166.
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other issues are belittled.^ Albeit this reassertion on the part of the conventional experts 
and scholars and the vivid examples that illuminate the unabated prevalence of such 
conceptions in international politics on the part of the policy makers, such as the case in 
the Gulf War^ ,^ critical approaches made a visible impact so as to enforce co-optation on 
the part of conventional views.
As our main concern in this chapter will not be a new formulation of security 
appropriate to the post-Cold War era, we will not dwell on these debates in detail. What 
we endeavour to investigate in this chapter is the dominant instrumental notion of 
security that characterises it as nearly above politics and as a mechanistic issue by its 
main features, and that depicts it as a sacred land of expertise. This conception of security
Stephen M. Walt, op. cit. note 3, responded to these challenges by a gesture of co-optation, however, with 
his abundantly clear reseivation of unconditiomil loyalty to the essence of realism and its state centric 
focus. He defines security studies as '"the study o f the threat, use, ami control o f military force'\ emphasis 
in original). Althougli he advocates a broadening of the concept of security over non-military issues, the 
main components of realism, as power and state centricism, rcrcai:': the real world issues which require
expertise to tackle with. Walt tries to mark tlie natural habitus of security studies as somewhere between 
that of the advisor to the prince and that of the wise man of the academy, closer to that of the first. For 
merit of security studies is bounded to their policy relevance and utility in the sense of applicability to 
policy issues. His concept of “methodological self- consciousness” reduces reflexivity to objectivism and to 
the merits of verification procedures, totally effacing other epistemological questions. Walt’s distinction 
between serious scholarship wliich committed to the main tenets of behaviouralism and propaganda (213-5) 
ignores tlie inlierent political character of the issues gathered under the rubric of national security. Though 
Walt emphasises tlie need for debate on security, his requirements for expertise that enforces the 
participants first to internalise the dominant discourses and then to speak, for policy relevance, and his 
conception of security limited to national security refusing any radical alteration of it, obscure much of the 
probable contention lines. His behaviouralist coimnitment totally discards any problematization of 
foundationary presumption such as the perceptions of llireat or the two dimensional role of slate in 
(in)security. Edward A. Kolodziej, in liis article “Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!”, 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol:34 No:4 (1992), pp.438-421, responded to tlie flaws in the Walt essay 
and provided a stimulating critique of it.
“ ...Analytically, it limits tlie objects of study and, ipso facto, constricts the scope of relevant theory 
needed to understand and explain ^nhat security is and wliat security pioblcms arc. iNoruiaiivcIy, it 
focuses almost exclusively on American national security rather than on international security or 
security per se; and, in the name of relevance, delegates too much of the agenda of security studies 
to policy makers. Methodologically, it restricts security to a liiglily selective and largely traditional 
array of disciplinary and interdisciplinary approachcs.”(p.421)
See David Campbell, Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty. Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War 
Critical Perspectives on World Politics Series, (Boulder- LondoiuLynne Rienner Publishers, 1993)
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empowers a narrow circle of academic/policy elite putatively endowed with the required 
“technical rationality”'* whereas disabling public to speak.
Commanding silence around the concept of the security is what we will tiy to 
challenge. This contestation is rather an exercise with the insights of the critical turn, 
more specifically that of postmodernism. The main point made in this chapter is that 
security is not merely instrumental in securing state and its community against the 
possibility of depredation of outsiders. Security discourses that sustain such an 
instrumental and unchangeable view of security issues, assume a significant role in the 
very construction of these entities and maintenance of their stability that they putatively 
secure. In other words, the instrumental conceptions of international security are 
instrumental for the construction and maintenance of collective identity serving as 
discursive sources.
To reveal the constructive character of security and to challenge its instrumental 
vision, hence to deontologise the ontologised premises on which this particular 
understanding of security is established as inevitable and immutable, is essential for a 
critical approach. More specifically, a critical approach requires raising questions about 
the central terms of conventional analysis. These concepts range from nation to state, 
anarchy to community. State sovereignty and anarchy will be the main subjects of our 
critical inquiry. To epitomise, what we are trying to do is to reveal the political character 
of security issues and to open a space for increasing democratic participation by 
undermining its theoretical foundations .
"jim  George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Rellntroduction to International Relations. Critical 
Perspectives on World Politics Series, (Boulder-Colorado:Lynnc Riermer Publishers, 1994),pp. 209-1012ibid., p. 210.
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We will try to find answers to questions of how security came to be conceived in 
this parochial and apolitical sense directly and was merely related to states, the military 
and power in its traditional meaning. How are alternative forms of security discarded and 
how is the prevalent one sanctified as the only plausible way through a complex web of 
discourses pertaining to international politics, the international system and consequent 
discourses of foreign policy and more specifically discourses of security? In answering 
these questions we will tiy to locate our answers in the context of modernity as both the 
international system and the study of it are artefacts of modern European history. The 
following part will be an interrogation of the realist conception of international politics 
that elevates security to its instrumental and consequently above politics status. In the 
ensuing parts we will try to demonstrate the indispensable relationship of the instrumental 
conceptions of foreign policy and more particularly security policy to this foundational 
articulation of international politics as an intrinsically different domain from the 
domestic. Simultaneously, we will interrogate the identity constitutive nature of the 
security issues.
3.2.Sovereignty vs. Anarchy: No Way Out?
Realist'^ approaches as the dominant paradigm in international relations field, and more 
substantially, probably the most venerated and internalized approaches among the foreign 
policy makers as the gospel of statecraft provide somehow simplified models of the 
international system and state as the main actors, that try to explain foreign policy 
behavior. Security issues, especially questions related to peace and war have an
In this cliaptcr, due to lack of space, different strands of realism arc to be collapsed into one category of 
realism. Here we have to neglect the differences within the classical realist school and between classical
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outstanding significance within the studies of international politics. Till the recent 
decades, efforts on this subject have been fissured along the main contention axis of 
realism-idealism. Alleged inheritors of realism and idealism (e.g., neorealism and 
neoliberalism) have advanced this contention, albeit altering significance is attributed to 
various aspects of the debate.
Yet, their common commitment to rationalism and consequent “behavioral 
conception of both process and institutions” and the conception of “self interested state” 
as the major agent of international politics '^* conceals two putatively opposite approaches 
on the familiar grounds of anarchy. In other words, in these rationalist paradigms the 
dichotomy of domestic and international that is “distinguished along the lines of 
community and anarchy”^^ , has a central place as the inception point of analysis.
The reification of this distinction between domestic and international is molded 
around the valorized concept of state sovereignty which contrary to many political 
concepts that are “essentially contested”, “elicits a commanding silence” as the “primary 
constitutive principle of modern political life”^^ .
realism and neo-realism. Realism is defined by two main features; i) state eentric analysis and ii) the central 
place of power as the main mediator between state actors.
’''Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics”. 
International Organisation, Vol:46 No:2 (1992), pp.391-2. Sec Robert Latliam, “Gcttmg Out From Under: 
Rethinking Security Beyond Liberalism and the Levels of Analysis” Millenium: Journal o f International 
Studies, Vol:25 No:l (1996), 77-108. for a concise debate on the inadequacies of the recent resort to 
liberalism for retliinking security. Latham put emphasis on the state ccntricism of liberalism, that miglit be 
considered as far transcending that of realism from different perspectives. Beside acquiescing states as the 
main agents in international politics they argue that peace can be maintained through the perfection of state. 
Due to this shortcoming liberals could not advance a profound understanding of international community 
beyond a couccpiion of it as liic giavilation between state units yielded by the Iransborder interaction, 
which was in turn enabled by the very existence of state.
’’ G. M. Dillon, “Modernity, Discourse and Deterrence”, Current Research on Peace and Violence, Vol: 12 
No:2(1989), p.91.
"’R. B. J. Walker, “Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Conlcmporaiy 
Political Practice”,!!! R. B. J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlowitz(eds.), Contending Sovereignities- Redefining 
Political Communittv, (Bouldcr-London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), p. 159.
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Current arguments about state sovereignty reveal the Janus-faced character of the 
concept.
“From the inside, state sovereignty appears to be a matter of monopoly or centering. The primary 
concern is then whether sovereignty lies with the state itself or with the people who are somehow 
“represented” by the state. From the outside, by contrast, state sovereignty is usually taken to mean 
just the opposite -fragmentation, autonomous “powers”, and a system of relations rather than a 
society, community, or polity. How has it been so easy, it may be asked, to construct accounts o f 
political life by assuming that state sovereignty means either monopoly or fragmentation, 
community or anarchy, the possibility o f a theory ofpolitical life guided by normative ambition or a 
theory o f international relations guided only by hopes o f pragmatic accommodation and regret at 
the tragic necessities o f war?”^^  (emphasis added)
On the community side there is order, sovereignty, peaceful coexistence, and thus 
progress. There is the possibility of “good life” within the state. For there is the 
possibility “to become a citizen; to establish society, community, culture, and nation; to 
trade of obligations with freedoms”’^ . The other side of the border that is enforced by the 
boundaries of the nation-state is defined by the dearth of these traits peculiar to the 
community. In more explicit terms, there, anarchy reigns. Anarchy as the logical 
corollary of state sovereignty stipulates self-help and power politics as inexorable*'' .^ Thus 
the conventional vision of international politic“· as a of wars, force and violence;
o f deviousness, intrigue, and diplomacy; and of power politics unfettered hy 
considerations ofjustice and legitimacf^^ (emphasis added) becomes inexorably strong 
and unchangeable.
In this way, rationalist paradigms by this way attribute overriding causal powers 
to the anarchic structure that pervades with its prevalent rules and “constitutes states with 
self-interested identities exogenous to practice”*^*. “Logic of anarchy” is entrenched as the
'Mbid.,p.l60.
WALKER, R. B. J., One World. Many Worlds: Stnig&lcs For A Just World. (Boulder, L. Ricnncr, 1988), 
P..35
Wendt, op. cit. note 14, p.396.
Walker, op. cit note 18,p,36.
Wendt, op. cit. note 14, p.392.
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major determinant of state behavior^ .^ Realist representation of the ‘real world’ “in terms 
of generalized, universalized and irreducible patterns of human behavior” reduces the 
whole range of issues in world politics to ceaseless struggle instigated by the anarchic 
structure and guided by the “utilitarian pursuit of self interest”^^ .
In this formulation of instrumental views of state behavior and security, two 
subthemes are interwoven with each other; first the positivist claim of depicting the 
‘reality’ existing “out there” as it ‘is’, and second, the “necessity” of accommodating to 
it. The second theme of necessity is assured through conferring “eternity, objectivity, 
gravity, substantiality and positive resistance to human purposes” upon the “reality” '^*. In 
other words, this conservative stance is based on the belief that reality is as it is for it 
could not be in another way. Hence, there remains no lease of life for alteration in 
interests and identities of the agents as this depiction fixes the system and the character of 
agents in it as eternal. From this vantage point, the ceaseless bickering of world politics is 
the natural result of nothing but the nature of state actors in an anarchic system. 
Therefore, power is the invaluable asset to be pursued in such a system in order to 
survive and rational behavior based on these presumptions is the indispensable trait of 
statecrafts .^
To recapitulate, in realist analysis of international politics the concept of state has 
been regarded as “the key to understanding the operation of the international system, its 
structure, and its fundamental characteristics”, even it is assumed that “states and
ibid., p395.
Jim George, “Underslanding Inlernational Relations after the Cold War: Probing beyond the Realist 
Legacy” in Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker (cds.). Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, 




interactions among them constitute the system i t se l fHowever ,  in bizarre contradiction 
to its sanctified status as the basic unit of analysis in the study of international relations, 
accounts about the nature of the state hardly transcend beyond simplistic definitions that 
assign to it several attributes, such as ‘eager for power maximization’. This lack of 
theorization on the concept of state is due to its acceptance as an ontological entity, “an 
unproblematic unity”^^ . As a consequence state is conceived to be commensurate to 
nation, power and sovereignty^*. When state is ontologized as a given reality that needs 
no further theoretical elaboration, the system that is assumed to be the direct product of 
the existence and interaction of states is also assigned a similar status.
These approaches based on an ontological distinction between ‘domestic’ and 
‘international’ are short of explicating formation and articulation of state identities and 
interests that are pivotal in molding the institutions and characteristics of anarchy and the 
multidimensional relation between them which in turn might be crucial in explaining 
state behavior. This distancing of ‘international’ from ‘domestic’ by delegating 
community to the sovereign domain of states is in complicity with the lack of interest of 
social theory in the field of international relations^^. As international signifies a domain 
where community does not exist social theory is silenced at its water edges. Beyond the 
borders of community, the analysis of political-military strategy, heart of the classical 
realist international relations studies, is dominated by state-centric reductionism in turn
26E. Fuat Keyman, “Problemalizing the Stale in International Relations Theory”, inClaire Tureime 
Sjolandcr and Wayne S. Cox (eds.), Beyond Positivism: Critical Reflections on Inteniational Relations. 
(Bouldcr-London: Lynne Ricmier Publishers, 1994), p.l54. 
ibid., 155.
Ibid.
^^Bradley S. Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence. Cambridge 
Studies in International Relations: 34. (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994). pp.1-3.
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contributing to the plight of ‘international relations discipline’. As Bradley S. Klein has 
stated
“What passed for “theory” among scholars of International Relations was largely a collection of 
totalizing efforts by postwar behaviouralists concerned to isolate various levels of analysis and to 
reduce political dynamics to static hypothesis and predictions. From the standpoint of sheer style, 
most of this was clumsily written. Worse yet, it tended to be narrow in terms of the range of its 
concerns and the mtellectual horizons it embraced” ”^.
Thus what is needed is the articulation of international relations by the insights from 
social and political theory. In other words to initiate a critical study with respect to 
foreign policy behavior that does not reiterate these uncontested conceptions, an 
ontological problematization of them is essential. This is what the postmodernists in the 
recent critical debates are engaging to do. Here two concepts, state and anarchy, reveal 
great significance due to their centrality in the analysis of international politics.
Both the untheorised status of the concept of state as an ontological existence^* 
and the bleak articulation of anarchy putatively rendering power politics inexorable and 
the current state of affairs inevitable and intransigent received much criticism from 
diiTcicni schoiars having divergent views of world politics'^ .^ A plausible solution to the 
theorization of state is to dwell on the concept in relational terms by underlining the 
interrelationship between state and society^ .^ This “both/and logic”, as Keyman puts.
Ibid., p.2.
E. Fuat Keyman, “Problematizing Ihe Slate in International Relations Theory”, for an account of the 
urges and combined endeavours to problcmatize the concept of state both in international relations theory 
and sociology. Keyman provides a critique of the “state centric model” which tries to retheorisc state as an 
institutional agent.
See Barry Buzan, “Peace, Power, and Security; Contending Concepts in the Study of International 
Relations” for a review of alternative interpretations of anarchy; one emphasising negative sides of 
anarchy, the other providing a mainly positive interpretation and the last, one advocated by Buzan, 
romprising a middle groimd Ir'l-wc'·” d"' A’‘‘'o See Ken Booth, “Security in .Ana.rcli}': Ulo;;iaii Rcalitan
in Theory and Practice”. Booth contends that realist power politics is not the only way to deal with the 
anarchy problematic and through a practical utopianism the potential for an “anarchical global ‘community
of communities’ might be appreciated belter than an incarcerated realist ignorance did.
33 ■Here also the ‘'ahislorical and luonislic inlerprelalion of community” as a “fixed thematic unity, a kind of 
essence, an identity transcending and uniting manifest differences in the world of human practice” is 
abandoned and a more dynamic vision of it is adopted where society docs not refer to a unity or to an
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“..brings about a conception of the state not only as a complex institutional ensemble with its own 
spatial and temporal specificity, but also as a site where condensation of political forces takes place. 
The slate constitutes not only “the sovereign place witliin which the highest internal laws and 
policies are enacted and from which the strategies toward external states and nonslate peoples 
proceeded,” but also “the site of the most fundamental division between inside and outside, us and 
them, domestic and foreign, tlie sphere of citizen entitlements and that of strategic responses”. In 
this sense, the both/and logic enable one to take into consideration not only the geopolitical 
dimension of international relations, but also the economic and discursive/cullural practices integral 
to the process of the constitution and reproduction of world orders, states, and societies.” '^'
Eschewing the complex debates on the retheorisation of state as an autonomous 
agent, we would put from the outset that the state must be conceived of not as a 
preestablished, unproblematic identity, but as a domain of sovereign practices. With 
respect to our aim in this chapter of procuring a more sophisticated analysis of foreign 
policy behavior and particularly security issues by challenging their instrumental 
conceptions, the intimate relationship between “national-social formations” and “context 
of global conditions and pressures”^^  in constructing the state and determining state 
action. Here the territoriality of the state is uncovered as a main component of the state 
that creates the inevitable link between external and internal dimensions of it . It must be 
underlined that “the existence of international relations was integral to the process of the 
very constitution of the modern state as nation-state”^^ . Furthermore, external dimensions 
of state action constitute one of the ways through which state appropriates autonomous
38power .
As evident from the brief account of the state above, this line of reasoning also 
challenges the conventional meaning of the anarchical structure of the international 
system. Instead of the conventional conception of anarchy as an ontological existence.
organic identity. Richard K. Ashley, “The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social 
Tlieory of International Politics”, Alternatives, Vol:12 (1987),p.406.
Keyman, op. cit. note 24, p.l54.
”  ibid, p. 158. 
ibid. p. 159. 
ibid, p. 177.
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following Alexander Wendt^^, our approach would be that “Anarchy is what states make 
o f i t” holding ascendant the role of practice and performance as “intersubjective 
conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction"'*'’. 
However, we would abrogate the assumption of the prior construction of state 
domestically as an empty apparatus, so as to recognize the embedednes of state and 
international system.
Still, conventional accounts of political life both within states and among them 
which are commenced from the assumption of unitary preestablished states as the 
container of the community cemented around a sovereign identity has relevance for our 
purposes as international relations discourses are generative of the very ‘fact’ that they 
are putatively merely interrogating as discursive resources. Through a problematization 
of these uncontested concepts we can peer in the veils of power. From now on we will 
dwell on the characteristics of the modern tenitorial state so as to highlight the 
interrelationship between domestic and international politics.
ibid, p.l66.
Wliat is to be appreciated in Wendt’s approach is tlic boundedness of structure to process or in other 
words the emphasis on identity construction and interest formulation endogenous to interaction. However 
his commitment to modernism and its tlieory of knowledge, defects the study with imphcit presuppositions 
of conventional approaches tliat has remained uimicntioncd in Wendt’s analysis. For example although he 
has underlined identity as relational and social, liis definition reduces it to a land of role perception on tlie 
part of the agent in relation to a specific area of performance with great degrees of alteration in response to 
changing social contexts. Commenced from this vantage point Wendt’s analysis effaces the 
muhiuimui.sional intcnclalioiis between agent and .suucuuc, dome.siic and international etc. Also his 
assumption of the prior establishment of state apparatus and will to survive domestically together with his 
conception of identity, limits the effects of intcrsubjective process only to the meaning formation in the 
realm of international against the other and obscures the radical interdependence of self and other, neither 
one preceding the other. See David Campbell, “Political Prosaics, Transversal Politics, and the Anarchical 
World”, ppl 2-13. for a brief critique of Wendt’s “modernist constructivism” and liis “epistemic realism”.
Wendt, op. cit note 14, pp.394-5.
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3.3.The Territorial Sovereign State: Convergent Boundaries of 
Community and Anarchy
The entrenched dichotomy of international and domestic signifies “[t]he central attribute 
of modernity'” in international politics” as a “peculiar and historically unique 
configuration of territorial space”'*^ . The territorial state as an artifact of European history 
and its omnipresent acquiescence as the potent and legitimate agent of politics have 
required a long period of transformation and expansion. The emergence of the modern 
system of states presumes astounding alterations both in the material environment, social 
settings and relations within their confines, and “the mental equipment that people drew 
upon in imagining and symbolizing forms of political community”'*^ . The last category, 
social epistemology, in terms of John Gerard Ruggie, signifies sets of modern discourses 
for modern societies.
In the formulation of the concept of absolute and exclusive state sovereignty, the 
understanding of private property, the burgcor.ir.i public sphere, the atomistic conception 
of community, all merge into one another. The organization of political space into 
modern territorial states and hence a system of states composed of this “territorially 
disjoint, mutually exclusive, functionally similar, sovereign states” requires “two
John Gerard Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Probleinatizing Modernity in International Relations”, 
International Organisation, Vol:47 No; 1 (1993), 139-47, giving an account of the evolution of postmodern 
debates first in the realm of aesthetics and style and then in international relations field dwell on the 
questions posed by these debates on the ‘project of modernity’.
“..the postmodernist debate has shifted in barely two decades from the domain aesthetics, to culture 
more broadly, to political economy. Correspondingly, tlie meaning of "modern” in “postmodern” 
has shifted from what it is in modem art, the modem novel, or modem architecture, first, to the so- 
called age of Enlightenment; next, to the stmcture of capitalist production; and then to the very 
epoch in Western history that was initiated by Renaissance.” (147)
Following Ruggie we would dwell on the last of these “space-time frames” as it was the epoch that “marks 




fundamental spatial demarcations; between public and private realms and between 
internal and external realms”'*'*.
Conventional accounts of political life, based on a fissure between the two 
domains -inside the state and outside of it- have been interwoven into the texture of 
“Western tradition of political theory”'*^ within the context of the permanent tension 
between universalism and particularism. State sovereignty, as a “peculiar form of 
sociopolitical individuation”'**^, reified a modern resolution of the claims of universality 
and particularity by confining the claims of universality to the territory under the 
sovereign control of the state'
“Inside the particular state, concepts of obligation, freedom, and justice could be articulated within 
the conte.xt of universalist accounts of Revelation, Reason, and History. Yet these claims to 
universal values and processes presumed, implicitly or e.xplicitly, a boundary beyond which such 
universals could not be guaranteed. Beyond the boundary, beyond Ute borders of the sovereign state, 
lay a world of difference: a world of others who were both spatially outside and usually presumed to 
be temporally backward; and a world of international relations, e\'en of international anarchy, in 
which different rules applied.”^^
The entrenched fissure between domestic and international realms, demonstrates 
that “the problematic identified by the principle cf state sovereignty is an effect of a more 
encompassing principle of sovereign identity”'*^ . State sovereignty is only one of the 
expressions of the quest for a basis to fix a point of identity, “a universality in space and 
time- against which all differences in space and time can be measured, judged, and put in 
their place.”'*^ Similar and parallel to the developments in visual arts, the “single-point
ibid., pp. 152-60.
'^’ibid., p.l55. As our main concern is the international politics we would mainly dwell on the second 
demarcation. However the essential role of the first demarcation between public and private realms in 
buttressing the second, must not be ignored. As the anarchy and sovereignty constitutes (he two opposite 
c;;d.s of die same spcclrum and intcrdcpcndcnl on cacli other by (heir very definition v^ 'c would tiy to 
elaborate on them simultaneously.
Walker, op. cil. note 16, p,I64.
Ruggie, op. cit note 39, p. 152.
” Walker, op. cit note 16, p. 165.
■'** ibid.
”  ibid., p. 175.
78
perspective” has also been transposed to the field of politics as the prevailing mode of 
conceiving and perceiving space. In the definition of political space “precision and 
perspective from a particular point of view: a single point of view, the point of view of a 
single subjectivity, from which all other subjectivity’s were differentiated and against 
which all other subjectivity’s were plotted in diminishing size and depth toward the 
vanishing point” °^ has been reified by the concept of state sovereignty.
State sovereignty implies the closure of the political space by exclusion/inclusion 
mechanisms that create an effect of sovereign identity. This can be inferred from the 
reasons why ‘domestic’ is illustrated by order and hence progress and on the other hand 
‘international’ is illuminated as anarchy and staleness. Within territorial (nation) states, 
claims of many, mainly individuals are tried to be conciled by the claims of the sovereign 
identity that are enabled by the locus of sovereignty and authority in the name of the state 
and community. However, relations between states can be understood as the interaction 
between the many claims to sovereign identity, ultimate conciliation of which within an 
account of one universal community (or one universal sovereign identity) seems 
impossible and inexorably lead to conflict and sometimes clashes^*. The perennial 
anarchy that reigns in the international domain signifies the lack of a sovereign identity.
This modern resolution to the tension between universalism and particularism is 
made plausible within the spatial understandings of the possibility of political community 
peculiar to early modern European intellectual life. In turn this conception of space 
particular to Western societies is based on “a particular naturalized, uniform Newtonian
Ruggie, op. cit. note 39, p.l59. 
Walker, op. cit. note 16, p.l74.
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space” In more explicit terms the principle of state sovereignty is sanctified, stabilized 
and articulated “m the context of an attempt to fix political community within spatial 
categories, categories in which time and change are understood as dangers to he 
contained’^ .^ This principle of state sovereignty embedded in a “spatial account of 
territory, fixed boundaries, and geopolitics” rendered the conception of territorial state as 
“territory, as geography, as extension across the physical surface of the earth” 
prevailing "^*.
State, beside being a geographic space, and even more important than this, 
signifies the political container of community as a textual space as opposed to the 
anarchic character of the 'international’. As a textual space, it is merely one of such 
spaces that have been delineated by similar spatial practices and sanctified by the “novel 
political doctrines and metaphysics”^^  of the modern times. In this sense we can 
enumerate public and private spheres, work space and leisure space or commercial space 
as similar textual spaces^ *^  by reserving the distinguished character of state as the one that 
has preserved the most intimate and vivid references to a physical place in constmcting 
its textual meaning.
Political analyses in general are tranquil about this textual categorization of living 
spaces. As Shapiro and Neubauer puts;
“The sliapc of a society’s spaces, e.g., leisure space, work space, public space, military space, etc., 
tends to remain largely implicit for a variety of reasons. One is, of course, the relatively long 
duration of that shaping process so that few can discern a process of actual boundary shaping or 
movement. However, part of the inattention to spatial predicates of policy discourse is positively 
administered. Dominant forms of social theory, for example both liberal and Marxist, fail, with
■'Simon Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War- The discourse of Politics. (London; Printer Publishers, 
New York: Guilford Publications, 1990), p.90 
Walket, op. cit notel6, p.l73. 
ibid.
”  Ruggie, op. cit note 39, p. 158.
Michael Shapiro and Deane Neubauer, “Spaliality and Policy discourse: Reading the Global City”, 
Allerriatives, Vol;14 (1989), p.303.
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some exceptions, to encode the spatial dimensions of human association. For the dominant 
tendencies in both these theoretical traditions, space is either natural or neutral; it is either the 
empty arena within which political association and contention develop or it is the sanctified, 
historically destined places whose boundaries and interna! configurations should remain 
inviolable. (emphasis added)
Depoliticization of space must be resisted as these textual spaces have direct influence on 
the re/production of discourses and conduct of power plays under their aegis. The 
politician, declaring something number one public enemy, strongly drags his foot on the 
textual space of the public sphere, or incriminating enemy being ah implacable disaster 
surfs between the textual spaces of domestic and international.
“The meaning and value that statements confer are inseparable from mapping of 
persons within which the statements are deposited. Intelligibility is intimately connected 
to standing, to the sites and locations from which meanings are shaped.^*” The 
conception of spatial organization of human society as a social construct means to 
recognize various forms of power and authority at work in its construction and hence 
commensurate to politicizing space^ .^ In our case, politicizing the space of state does not 
mean to ignore its existence or its sustained importance. It means to open the concept to 
critical scrutiny in order to désacralisé the space it constituted by deconstructing spatial 
practices entailed necessary for its sustained strength and challenging the conception that 
spatial demarcations of the social life delegate everything to its natural habitus, be it the 
public or private sphere or work versus leisure space. Through this genealogical/ 
deconstructionist analysis we can have a more comprehensive analysis of foreign policy 
behavior than the realist account of billiard ball.




The modem resolution of the tension between claims of universality and 
particularity that reifies community in spatial terms around a sovereign identity sanctified 
by state, also opens up an aporia in ethical understandings. Politics and ethics might 
converge as long as claims of universality can be maintained. State within its sovereign 
confines monopolized the legitimate use of power on behalf of providing public order 
and promoting national interests. So this resemblance or articulation of ethics to politics 
can be maintained only within the domain of state sovereignty, where claims of 
universality are held to be prevailing. The only “ethical disposition of states is grounded 
internally” which is associated with the “integrity and security of the state” °^.
Here we can observe the paradigmatic dichotomy of ‘men versus citizens’ 
through the lenses of which international relations theory “involves conceptual aspects of 
international relations concerned with particularistic duties to one’s community by virtue 
of membership in that community”"^* and ignore any universalist moral claims such as in 
favor of peace. State acting immorally in the international realm behaves morally 
according to a morality confined to the concepts of national interest. It is evident that 
there are rules governing international politics. In the international realm, the legitimate 
use of power became fused with “statecraft, steadily discrediting its deployment for 
primitive expansion and aggrandizement”^^ . However, this does not mean that “primitive
®®David Campbell, Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty. Etliics. and the Narratives of the Gulf War. 
Critical Perspectives on World Politics Series, (Boulder- London.Lymie Rieimer Publishers, 1993), p.81.
Beverly Neufcld, “Tlie Marginalisation of Peace Research in International Relations”, Millenium: Journal 
o f  International Studies, Vol:22 No;2 (1993), p.l73. Beverly Neufcld tries to evaluate the reasons for 
marginalisation of Peace Research and tries to offer e.xpedient ways for conciliation of the two fields. First 
part of article tltat explains why peace theory is self-marginalising and marginalised is more striking. 
Neufeld asserts that the main reason for distancing of peace research from intcniational relations studies 
lies within their different responses to the tension between universalism and particularism. Tlieir 
conceptualizations vary in accordance with their stance vis-a-vis men and citizens dichotomy. Whereas 
international relations view issues trough the lenses of particularistic interests of particular communities, 
peace research “concerned with miiversalistic obligations to humanity.”
“  Ruggie, op. cit. note 39, p. 161.
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expansion and aggrandizement” disappeared or steadily diminish. This means that a 
forcefijl pretext emerges for practices of othering, relegating the other to an inferior status 
both morally and physically, especially in case of conflict.
In the dearth of a sovereign identity that could mediate the difference, the “I-it 
relationship” to the other in which “one knows and uses other persons or things without 
allowing them to exist for oneself in their uniqueness”^^  gains the upper hand. The “I-it 
reiaiion” to other and universalist narratives on politico/ethical theory have underlined 
the “egoism-anarchy thematic” and “ethic of (non)responsibility in International 
relations” that have been foundational both for realist and neo-realist streams '^ .^ Driving 
on a selective reading of Western philosophy, realism created a self-affirming cosmos of 
its own that has been unfolded out from “otherworldly and/or externalized premises and 
foundational sources”'^ .^
These foundations delineate the “unchanging politico-ethical foundations of 
global existence” ’^'' The universalized and essentialized themes of the ‘“all-permeaLl»i5 ’, 
power-lusting, egoistic human nature” that has been transposed to the relations between 
states inherent evil in political behavior and unchanging structural forces embedded 
within the anarchical system render any conciliation between ethics and politics 
inconceivable and detached political responsibility from “temporal political actors caught 
in an evil system”^^ . Realist discourses, incriminating the system and the ‘other’ as the
“ David Campbell, “The Politics of Radical Interdependence: A Rejoinder to Daniel Warner”, Millenium: 
Journo!ofInicrnalionolSluclies, (1996), Vol. 25 No l.p., 133..
“  Jim George, “Realist ‘Etliics’, International Relations and Post-modernism: Tliiiiking Beyond tlie 
Egoism-Anarchy Thematic”, Millennium: Journal o f Internalional Studies, ( 1995, Vol. 24 No 2, pp. 198- 
203.
“  Ibid.
“  ibid., pp. 198-9.
“  Walker, op. ci. npole 18, p. 118.
“  Jim George, op. cit. note 62, pp. 199-200.
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uncivilized actor who is caught by its primitive instincts, procure “politics of principle 
and claims of moral righteousness”'"^ .
Presumptions that eonstitute a fertile ground for this double move -detaehment of 
ethics from international politics on the one hand and securing the claims for moral 
righteousness on the part of the concerned agent on the other hand- are embedded within 
discourses of foreign policy and aggrandized by sovereign practices. All kinds of 
exclusion/inclusion mechanisms, practices of othering, discourses of threat and similar 
discourses intermingle with each other as a loosely knitted bundle of sovereign praetices 
that secures identity and tackles with the ambiguity surrounding it.
3.4. A Critical Formulation of Foreign Policy Behavior
Foreign policy analysis, although a central subject for the field of international studies, is 
mainly based on “ideas and frameworks introduced before 1975” and till recent decade 
has attracted feeble excitement and “modest theoretical ambitions”’® Nevertheless, still 
the bulk of studies on foreign policy analysis exhibit a quite different character than the 
systemic theories. Especially, in studies about decision making that challenges 
mechanistic rational actor models by their focus on ideological and cultural variables, 
psychological factors or the significance of organizational factors on policy outcomes” , 
the difference between the two levels of analysis becomes more apparent. Difference 
rooted from the fact that sway of “strict behaviouralism” that reigns unabated in systemic 
theories, enfeebles in this area and is transformed into a "meaning oriented
Campbell, op. cil. note 58, p.23.
™Cliristopher Hill and Margot Liglit, “Foreign Policy Analysis”, in Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom 
(eds.). International Relations : a handbook of current theory'. (London Frances Printer, 1985), p.l56,.
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behaviouralism” which tries to take into consideration “the subjective meanings attached 
by state managers to their actions”.’^
However, approach that we try to advance here is quite different from these 
previous approaches. For it rejects the conceptualization of the subjective meanings as 
merely “intervening variables between the stimulus (the action context) and the response 
(behavior)”^^ , a “filtering device -between the empirical reality of the international 
context and international behavior” '^*. Our approach, in line with what Mark Neufeld 
dubbed inerpretivist approaches, tries to formulate not subjective but intersubjective 
meanings that unfold within complex web of discourses. To reiterate, this approach aims 
to unravel their constitutive role.
To reformulate foreign policy behavior, not as an instrumental device of the state 
but as a constitutive act of the state that reproduces and rooted in the intersubjetive 
meanings, taken for granted conceptions of the state, the state sovereignty, community, 
anarchy or the international system and their claim to be natural must be destabilized and 
unfamiliarised by rendering their claim untenable through a genealogical/ 
deconstructionist approach. Then the ‘billiard ball’ states of realism become inefficient to 
explain foreign policy behavior and field is open to theoretical explorations for different 
conceptualizations.
Both the state sovereignty and the arena of ‘international’ are “domains of 
political conducf’ and signify power relations within their construction and
’^For a literature review of tlicse issues that comprises first half of the 1980s see Christopher Hill and 
Margot Light, “Foreign Policy Analysis”.




conceptualization, which in turn interwoven into the power-knowledge texture As 
state is not a preestablished, stable identity, it requires active performance to create the 
effect of a secure identity and to gain the status of the agent in the international realm 
through the well-entrenched concept of state sovereignty^* .^
Foreign policy has assumed a pivotal role in this performance of constructing 
state as the sovereign identity through political practice. Foreign policy practices, with 
respect to creating an effect of sovereign identity, have the peculiarity of establishing “an 
alignment between territoriality and the various dimensions of identity, so that it becomes 
possible to speak of a particular state w'ith a definable character” . Being a sovereign 
practice on the axis of identity/difference, foreign policy has a strikingly intimate 
relationship with the discursive effects of representation and interpretation.
In more explicit terms “the conduct of foreign policy depends upon and has a 
predilection for texts” both in its literally meaning and in its broad usage similar to 
discourse^*. The first thing to be mentioned here is the role of the depictions of the 
international system -as we have outlined in the previous section-, modern political 
doctrines and metaphysics as discursive resources^^. The very agents (or subjects) of 
foreign policy are subjectified through complex modes of language that could be read as 
the “systems of signification”*®. Also the widely acknowledged agents in international 
politics were established and developed in the legal sense through the “dense archive of
' "G. M. Dillon, 'The Alliance of Security and Subjeclivily”, Current Research on Peace and Violence, 
VoI;13 No;3 (1990-91), pp. 101-3.
Campbell, op. cit. note 58, p.24.
”  ibid.. 
ibid.p.9
Bradley Klein, op. cit. note 27, p.5.
**’ Dillon, op. cit. notc72, p.l03.
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written documentation”^  ^ Secondly, the foundationary information about the world 
outside national borders received in forms of reports that are them selves products of 
interpretation and try to offer a re/representation of complex events, is subject to further 
interpretation in the process of policy formulation.
As David Campbell concisely captures; “the basis for decision making in foreign 
policy is invariably some form of mediated experience in which those referents signified 
as belonging to “external” reality are in actuality “internal” to discourse.”^^  Then foreign 
policy is not a mere reaction to the outer world by unitary preestablished entities as the 
reality that seems having a reality outside is internal to foreign policy discourses. The 
first source of contention is the fact that “states are not subjects with essences” endowing 
them with “essential properties and propensities”, which are in turn assumed to set the 
explanatory ground for state activities'^, one of which is claimed to be the need and quest 
for security. The second contention, which is intimately related to the first one is that 
these two domains of domestic and international politics, ‘us’ and ‘them’ do not have 
autonomous existence from each other or one does not precede the other. They are 
constructed through their relation with the other. Foreign policy practices signify one of 
these constitutive practices.
“Tills means that the domestic and tlie external, the state and the international system, and the 
sovereign and tlie anarcliic are not domains Uiat exist in essence prior to a relationship with each 
other. Wliile the precise form and content of the identities of these domains is dependent on specific 
liistorical contexts, we can say tliat identity in the realm of global politics can be understood as the 
outcome of exclusionary practices in wliich resistant elements to a secure identity on the inside are 
linked tlirough a discourse of danger to wiUi tlireats identified and located on the outside. This 
demarcation is achieved through an inscription of danger on ambiguity in such a way that the 
differences witliin are transformed into differences between.... Foreign policy is thus to he
ibid.
Campbell, op. cit. note 58, p.9. 
Dillon, op. cit. note 72, p. 113.
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retheorized as a boundary-producing practice central to the production and reproduction o f the 
identity in whose name it operates. (emphasis added)
Foreign policy is, hence, in more explicit terms, an identity constitutives act of the 
modern nation state, which invokes inclusion/exclusion mechanisms on different levels 
of sameness and difference. This identity constitutive dimension of the foreign policy can 
manifest itself in a very complex fashion as it is emerged through the interaction of a 
multitude of internal and external factors. Here several types of systems of 
inclusion/exclusion mechanisms and accompanying dominant discourses converge into 
one another. The task of formulating foreign policy or in more explicit terms, task of 
making foreign is performed through delicate discourses of national security production 
of which based on political realigns.
3.5. High Politics: Securing ‘us’ against ‘them’
In the evil system of the realist cosmos imbued with unfettered dangers threatening the
very existence of the actors, it is plain why security issues are considered to be ranking
high as ‘high politics’. In the sense of being defined “in reaction to threats”, security is
defined in “negative terms” as the duty of the state authority to defer threats and preserve
the certainty of life.^  ^ This negativity and intimacy to the status quo inherent within the
wide usage of the concept renders security “essentially empty”.
“For all the verbiage devoted to the concept, it is not a sign o f  positive political initiative. Coupled 
to the modern conception o f territorially sovereign states, a dominant theme o f international 
political reasoning is the protection o f state boundaries from  military incursion from  another 
state. Tlie conventional military understanding of security represents security in geopolitical tenns 
as the spatial exclusion of threats
..Tliis metaphysical construction of security as stasis and spatial exclusion fundamentally contradicts 
the predominant theme of modern society, which is change, interaction and acceleration. This
''"'David Campbell, “Global Inscription: How Foreign Policy Constitutes the United SM qs", Alternatives, 
Vol:15No;3 (1990),p.265.
Sim on Dalby, op. cit. n o te l, pp.97-8.
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understanding of security is inlierently politically conservative precisely because it emphasises 
permanence, control, and predictability, and, it should be noted, it can easily invoke the use of 
violence to maintain the desired stability.*®” (emphasis added)
However, the factor that would be emphasised here in explicating the resonance
of security issues and more specifically their above politics status is its direct relevance to
subjectification^^ or in more explicit terms identity constitution of major political units as
potent and legitimate agents of politics. The relation between subjectification
(objectification) and security discourse is effaced by the ontologization of the political
agents as we have mentioned above. As G. M. Dillon has put it;
“Even for tliose who question strategic and realist conceptions of security, therefore, the subject o f 
security remains then an autonomous subject whetlier Uiat subject is tlie domestic conununity of the 
realist school of international relations, the nation-state of die strategists, Buzan’s atomistic biological 
individual, the basis of the reasoning remains the same.....
In sum, from a modernist perspective, discourse about security is premised upon a conception of the 
subject (individual, group or slate) possessing a particular and fixed identity, an auUientic reasoning self 
whose ambitions are realised in lime and space according to the instmmental plans, strategies and 
tactics wliich constitute its politics.”**
However such an ontologized conception of subject must be resented if we want 
to dwell on often unmentioned dimensions of security policies and discourses. First, 
security constitutes one of the main pretexts on which ciaims of legitimacy of the state 
sovereignty are formulated and hence its claim to a sovereign identity and legitimate 
agency is buttressed. The foundation of political agency and legitimacy is based on the 
discourse of danger. The very essence of state sovereignty and conception of state as a 
subject, in the Hobbesian tradition, is based on a conception of radically endangered self 
who seeks obsessively self-preservation**’. This is prevalent and also necessary both on 
individual and the state level to carve out a secure identity in the face of the alterity of
*® Ibid, p.98.
*^  Dillon, op. cit. nole72, p. 114.
**G. M. Dillon, “Modernity, Discourse and Deterrence”, Current Research on Peace and Violence, Vol: 12 
No:2 (1989),p. 92..
S9 D illon , op. cit. note 72, pp. 105-7.
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life. For the imminent danger and the belief in the existence of the enemy impose 
discipline on the human being to socialise and accept the authority of the Leviathan^^.
Secondly, related to the first one, sovereignty, as the decisionistic power, endows 
the ruler with the right and conditions him to set the norm and to distinguish the 
“exception” to overcome insecurity. “[S]tate practices not only claim a monopoly over 
the legitimate use of force in a given territory but also make a more pervasive and 
insidious claim to monopolise the legitimate definition of danger, and so identity.” *^ This 
dimension of security procures the appropriate discursive devices to impose discipline on 
the diversity of the society. In short security is fundamental in fixing the identities of 
political persona ficta. Practices of differentiation also function as the practices of 
identity construction and maintenance. Thus, “there could be no discourses of 
(in)security, however, without them also, and simultaneously being discourses of identity 
and danger^^”.
“,,[b]ecause “security” is a process of subjectification and not the end of an unproblematic subject. 
Securing one thing requires jtLO ujiJt lauuii, classification and definition. It has, in short, to be 
identified. What distinguishes the political discourses of modenhty are their preoccupation with 
securing tlie grounds and characteristics of political subjectivity. Tliat is to say, discourses of 
(in)security have always to be, in the first instance, processes of separating out and characterising 
that it can knowingly, be secured. And they do this not simply according to what is feared, but rather 
according, in the first mstance to what is different; for in the war against alterity, eveiyfiiing that is 
different is immanently dangerous and can, therefore, take the form of tlireatening othemess.'^^
In accordance with the spatial conception of state and community that it is 
presumed to represent, security undertaken by state is also based on a “spatial 
exclusion’’^ '*. In other words, in accordance with the concept of state representing a 
spatially limited resolution to the question of sovereign identity, security is based on a
®” lbid., p.106.
Ibid., p. 109.
Ibid., p. 108. 
ibid,, pp. 114-5.
Walker, op. cit. note 18, p. 121.
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sovereign practice of’determining difference as ‘other’ and controlling the determined 
difference. And hence constructing ‘identity’ in relation with the difference and 
stabilising this ‘identity’. This spatialization confers a new significance to geopolitical 
understandings. Discourse of otherness and geopolitics merge with each other within the 
discourse of realism.
In the fact that geopolitics gained an increasing visibility in the interpretation of 
world politics again we see the essential role of the European outward expansion and the 
emergence of a truly global states system. For geopolitics, denoting “a general concern 
with the interrelationship of space and power”, began to assume significance in the 
articulation of world politics by the end of the nineteenth century when the European 
imperial powers had swallowed the uncolonized world with greed and when an enormous 
world wide change has swept the globe^ .^
Geopolitics mainly concerned with the maintenance of order in the states system 
and assigns this important task to the great powers. In the play of great power, geography 
turns into empty space on a chess board that can be conceived and distributed as zones of 
domination, influence and security belts or bastions against other great powers. All the 
permanent themes prevailing in geopolitical understanding are underlined by the darkly 
connotations of realism which emphasizes the inequalities between states and the 
irrelevance of all normative concerns. Ethical concerns are silenced by a commanding 
resonance of mechanistic power politics, alliance formation and efforts for domination, 
penetration etc.. These institutions are seen as the mechanistic devices of the great 
powers to maintain world order.
95 Sim on Dalby, op. cit. note 50, p.35.
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This conception of security based on spatial exclusion of otherness, in turn, 
denotes a claim to sovereign right to differentiate foe from friend, enemy from citizen.
other from self as we have mentioned above^ .^ State as the embodiment of national-social 
formation assumes this right and the task. The construction of other signifies a power 
relationship, and power is exercised through differentiation. Drawing on the perennial 
theme of identity/difference which privileges identity as opposed to the ‘other’, creates 
dichotomous scales of hierarchy, identity is tried to be purified by “a spatial and temporal 
deferment of the Other”^^ .
“The exclusion of Ihe Oilier and the inclusion, incorporation and administration of the Same is the 
essential geopolitical moment. The two processes are complementary; tlie Other is excluded as the 
reverse side of the process of geopolitics in which territoiy is divided, contested and ruled. The 
ideological dimension is clearly present in how tliis is justified, explained and understood by the 
populations concerned; “the Other” is seen as different if not an enemy; “We” are “the Same” in that 
we are all citizens of the same naiion, or parts of Üie Western system.” ^
The ‘other’ might be located within or outside of the community. Nevertheless, in
both cases, the ‘other’ being within or outside the community, the spatial dimension of
the ‘other’ is underlined. When the ‘other’ is within the community it is a leakage from
outside, society is contaminated by the devil of the ‘other’ occupying somewhere else.
The sense of internal enemies allied to the external ones expand the conception of
security “to provide order within ... boundaries” and to use a wider range of means such
as “police functions and surveillance, counter “subversion” and counter “terrorism””
Furthermore, the sanctified concept of integrity of state with its people and
ferrîtory serves as the main pretext in the disciplining of the society, which putatively is
and must be homogeneous, by the help of discursive assets of security. In accord with
Walker, op. cit. note 18, .119. 
Dalby, op. cit. note 50, p. 18.
Simon Dalby., “Geopolitical Discourse” The Soviet Union As Other”, A//ernaüves, Vol: 13 No:4 (1988), 
p.418.
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the monolithic and stale conception of community, it requires silencing, undermining, 
marginalising and exclusion of differences existent within the society by creating a sense 
of collective unity and superiority through “aestheticized experiences”'*’®.
Public sphere, which is the putative realm of “rational and consensus-seeking 
debates” in Western type democracies, is imbued with a teleological understanding of 
history through which society realizes its own ideal prototype'®'. This embeddedness of 
such an ideal in the form of yearning to reach social cohesion and unity carries with itself 
the risk of offsetting political debates by the aestheticization of politics that aims to 
procure citizens with the “pleasurable collective experience of a unified national 
body” '®^. A sophisticated set of signs such as flag or the war hero that can “help 
counteract the linguistic, cognitive, and institutional differentiation of modern 
societies”'®^  are invoked in order to create “Oneness and Otherness” ensuing each other. 
Here, we examine multiple moves as internal and external enemies are indispensable for 
the sake of imaginary unity'®''.
Moreover, security issues, due to the indispensable vitality of the national security 
and the necessity of promoting national interests, require consensus. Defying consensus 
that has been buttressed through security discourses carries the risk of being marginalised 
as traitor or the number one public enemy. From this perspective it is not surprising that 
during the Gulf War, in the United States, Deconstruction, “a movement in humanities
® Dalby, op. cit note 1, p.98.
"^Jochen Schulte-Sasse and Linda Schulte-Sasse, “War, Otherness, and Illusionary Identifications with the 
State”, Cultural Critique, VoI;19 (Fall, 1991),p.68. Jochen and Linda Schulte-Sasse (1991) gives a vivid 
c.vaniplc of “acsllidici/.cd c.\ijuicnccs of collcclivc unity and suixiriority lor the cultural rcproduclion of 





' “  Ibid., p.74.
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that investigates the rôle of Otherness in culture and thus may undermine the smooth and 
unquestioned functioning of cultural reproduction” was declared as number one public 
enemy by some columnists*®^ In addition to this taboo status, security issues with their 
increasingly technical nature “lead to a fundamental withdrawal from the participation in 
questions of life and death, a capitulation to expertise and specialists”
Rationalist approaches to security based on well established realist paradigms of 
international relations, in the final analysis, depoliticize security issues reducing them to 
an instrumental device and processes of state actor vis-a-vis external world that must be 
handled by experts. This depoliticization is hypocritical in two ways; first it obscures the 
essentially political nature of the security issues and secondly, it empowers groups and 
individuals occupying the power nexus of a society to create political iconography around 
security issues. The mainly conservative power that it yields devalues any kind of 
normative assertion that tries to alter the “best of all possible worlds”.
ibid., p.79. 
ibid.,p.81.
106R. B. J. Walker, “Culture, Disscoursc, Insecurity”, yl//6?/77t7//ve'.v, Vol:ll No:4 (1986), p.491.
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CHAPTER IV; CONCLUSION
In this thesis our concern was mainly (meta)theoretical. Our inquiry of the critical turn 
was restricted to postmodernism and through occasional references to Critical Theory. 
Because of these limitations, a long series of relevant and salient debates related to 
hi,storical structuralism, neo-Marxism, feminism, ecological movements and others have 
been neglected. Secondly, the literature through which this study was proceeded was not 
a coherent body in which congruent debates are advancing but a bundle of different and 
loosely knitted arguments advanced by different concerns. So our review is far from 
being comprehensive for various reasons. Still, taking into consideration the modesty of 
our aim, we think and hope that these omissions and self-imposed limitations do not 
culminate in a considerable subversion in our vconclusions that can be detrimental with 
respect to our aim.
The cardinal aim of this study is not to procure a full agenda for post-Cold War 
international relations studies, but to demonstrate the fertility of the recent 
metatheoretical ferment in the field that has been exacerbated by the critical turn. This 
fertility is evident in its ability to procure new and promiscuous conceptualizations, 
theoretical approaches, fresh questions within many subfields, in addition to meditate on 
brand new areas. By its main tenets this study posits ideas which counterpose that the 
metatheoretical inquiries are superfluous to the study of international relations. Its
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celebratory mode refers largely to this conviction in favor of the merits of the recent 
metatheoretical reverberation.
However, this celebratory mode is also intimately pertinent to the urge for theory 
construction. Thus, we try to exhibit a more ample example of how the metatheoretical 
arguments can culminate in different theoretical orientations toward the most immediate 
concerns of international relations scholarship, even in the most incarcerated areas such 
as security studies. T^he critical turn and the metatheoretical ferment that it instigated 
make their first category of contributions via interrogating and often rejecting what is 
conventionally held to be primary or substantive study issues vis-a-vis superfluous issues 
according to the holy bible of the discipline. Epistemological, ontological and normative 
questioning fling open the doors of the field to the previously undermined or neglected 
issues, like gender, ecology, or more broadly to culture. In our case of security studies the 
critical turn paved the way to the introduction of new and broader conceptions of 
security. Secondly, the subfield of security studies has been enriched by the adoption of 
the new approaches that handle the field of security studies as a bundle of discourses 
embedded into the discourses of international relations. This second move helps to 
deepen the area by trying to answer how conventional conceptions of security come to be 
dominant.
Within this study we mainly focus on the theoretical issues and their intricate 
relationship to politics. To remind a few, we have dwelt on politics of representation, the 
knowledge-power imbroglio, normative implications of a denial of the normative 
concerns, identity/diflbrence etc. Underlined in this study are the themes mainly related 
to the postmodern interrogation of the sovereign practices of modernity that leads to “the
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closed nature of world political imagination”’. As we will mention again in the following 
section, the celebratory mode of this thesis has highlighted the resistance to closure that 
has an indispensable role in opening an ethical space for the other or the marginalised to 
speak on behalf of itself However, our concern was limited to the resistance to closure 
mainly pertinent to the theoretical :magination. We neglect the questions related to the 
formulation of an agenda of postmodern politics. Although this is not a question that can 
be dwelled on within a few pages, we have to remind that the warnings of 
postcolonialism about the universalizing tendencies of postmodernism must be taken into 
view when considering an agenda of postmodern politics.
4.1. Celebrating Confusion
4.1.1. Quest for Consensus V5 Indulgence Toward Intellectual Plurality
The contribution of the critical turn with respect to intellectual plurality is a controversial 
one. As we have mentioned before it was criticized as a plurality directed to an 
unremarkable aim, a plurality for its own sake. The counter argument of this thesis is that 
the critical turn both widens and deepens the field of international relations. One ample 
achievement of the critical turn with respect to widening the field is to open the gates for 
new research questions about ideologies, values, discourses, etc. which has been 
previously been left to the radical or marginalised intellectuals who are hardly venerated 
among university circles. This achievement is paradoxically related to the re­
conceptualization of a celebrated concept of realist analysis, namely power. Instead of a
'Molly Cochran, “Poslmodernism, Ethics and International Political Theorj'”, Review o f International 
Studies, Vol:21 No:3 (July 1995), p.238. In addition to tliis theme, Cochran enumerates two more themes as 
“the closed nature of world political imagination” and “a politics of resistance”.
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primitive notion of power, a more elaborate one, more suitable for the exercise of power 
in modern times is put on the spots This is crudely the power on minds, more pervasive 
and incisive than the physcalistic ncition of realist power.
These new areas can be summed up under the rubric of ‘culture’. Culture here 
does not denote another additional, secondary factor to be patched into the previously 
ideated models of the world ‘out there’. It is not epiphenomenal but causal and pervasive. 
However, still we can not add the revival of cultural issues in the analysis of international 
politics as a site of complete success. Culture^ is still a term, even the meaning of which 
is difficult to sketch out. Consequently increasing concern with cultural phenomena poses 
new problems for the analysis of the social reality. The concept of culture and its relation 
to other social factors also remain to be worked thoroughly^.
New mode of analyses have been achieved, like deconstruction and genealogy. 
New research methods like literary criticism have emerged. These have enriched the 
intellectual assets of the field inevitably extending the field of international relations 
studies to previously alien terrains. Here the question is whether the positivist/empiricist 
methods are or can be declared ’'oid and null in the face of new methods or their 
inadequacies with respect to the analysis of the social phenomena. The answer to this 
question is hardly affirmative. It might be argued that our studies must not be method 
driven. But what are the implications of the question driven study? Does it mean that we 
could use different methodologies for different problem areas reducing them to neutral
“See R. B. J. Walker, “World Politics and Western Reason: Universalism, Pluralism and Hegemony”, 
World Order Models Project, Working PaperNo;19, 1982, especially pp. 15-17, for a brief review of 
different conception culture and its relevance to oürer social factors and Robert J. C. Yoimg, “Colonial 
Desire- Hybridity in tlicory, culture and Race” (London & New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 30-31 for a 
liistorical review of the evolution of meaning and comiotations of the word ‘cultinc.
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tools or ignoring the intricate relationship between the theory and knowledge underlining 
intellectual enterprise and the concerned methodology? Hence the proper relationship 
between these different methodologies and research questions would be debated further.
The celebratory and optimistic mood as to the state of the discipline is curried by 
the significant differences between ‘yesterday’s crisis’ which we have defined as the 
perpetual defrustration of the yearnings to become a rigorous science fashioned in the 
model of positivist natural sciences and the present crisis. The present crisis served to 
deepen the intellectual enterprise within the field. At first hand, probably one of the most 
salient consequences of the critical turn is that it managed to alter the foci of the 
disciplinary debates by questioning the ideal of becoming a ‘science’ fashioned in the 
model of the natural sciences and its expression in the positivist bias. It largely managed 
to outdate the quest for a foundational consensus about the subject mater, analytical tools, 
methodologies within the field as a prerequisite of a truly scientific discipline.
Still, if the greatness of the issues and the salience of their implications for the 
study of international relations is taken into consideration, these debates are unlikely to 
be resolved in the immediate future. Furthermore the desirability of such a resolution is 
marred by incredulity. For example what is at stake in the epistemological debates is not 
only the appropriate method for the study of world politics or a contest between empirical 
and interpretative methodologies. It is a debate far transcending the issues of 
methodology. In other words this debate is not confined to the concerns of international 
scholarship. Naturalism, which Hollis has defined as the belief that “human beings and 
societies belong to a single natural order, which yields its secrets to a single scientific
 ^See R. B. J. Walker, “World Politics and Western Reason: Universalism, Pluralism and 
Hegemony”,pp. 16-7 for different conceptions of tlie relationsliip between culture and other aspects of
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method”, is the indispensable underpinning for the claim of the social sciences to be 
scientific'*. When this belief is abrogated where could we drop the anchor of the claims of 
objective, scientific knowledge? Or must we ideate a different understanding of the social 
sciences as a whole, a new route for their studies other than the one aiming to reach the 
Eden of the truth? Questions outflank into the limitless horizons of the philosophy of the 
social sciences^, unlikely to be resolved once and for all.
More specifically, what the critical approaches have managed is to rattle the 
throne of the rationalist approaches to international relations and more profoundly the 
realist paradigm, the long enduring hegemon of the field roaming around the every comer 
of the field with great self-confidence. Nevertheless this success is not commensurate to a 
relinquishment on the part of the dominant paradigms of the field. Still the impact of the 
critical approaches is hardy enough to create a “sense of humility and puzzlement” that 
forces us to “remain in awe of the complexities and changes at work in the world, ever 
ready to concede confusion and reminding ourselves that our conclusions must perforce 
be tentative” .^ Rosenau claims that to generate such a sense of awe, we must deal with 
observable and substantive issues of the world affairs and their mysteries instead of 
superfluous issues of understanding, meaning methodology or others related to the 
“activities of the theorists” .^ Our contention is that contrary to Rosenau’s statement such 
a bewilderment and curiosity was instigated by the strong assertions of the issues related
human life in different schools of thought.
Martin Hollis, “Tlie Last Post”, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marj'sia Zalewski (eds.), “International 
Thcoiy: Positivism and Beyond”, (Cambridege: Cambridge University, 1996), p..304 
 ^Ken Booth, “Dare not to Know: International Relations Theory versus the Future”, in Ken Booth and 
Steve Smitli, “Inteniational Relations Tlieory Today” (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 330.
^Janies Rosenau, “Probing puzzles persistently: a desirable but imporabable future for IR theory” in Steve 
Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), “International Theory: Positivism and Beyond”, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1996)p.p. 309-11 
’ ibid., pp.310-13.
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to theory that have been labelled by Rosenau as a hindrance to remain in awe as well as 
the abrupt changes experienced in world politics. Because “..thinking about thinking 
always threatens to undermine any confidence we may have in what we know and how
we act.”^
In short, the present crisis seems to attain the legitimacy of intellectual plurality.
Increasing indulgence toward intellectual dissonance is the harbinger of the new era in
the field. As K.J. Holsti succumbly epitomized;
“Given Ihe divisions that characlerize intemalional llieory today, it is unlikely that we will ever have 
a single ‘grand theory’ of political and economic life at the international or global level. Gone are 
the days when, as Quincy Wriglit and others hoped, we could develop a sopliislicate ‘science’ of 
international relations, much less a standard repertoire of critical questions to be explored. 
Fragmcnlation and pluralism are the essential characteristics of the tlieoretical enterprise today®.”
4.1.2. Widening the Realm of the Normative
This plurality is not commensurate to an interparadigm debate. Issues at stake in the 
‘present crisis’ do not revolve around debates concerning levels of analysis or different 
actors to be taken as the main unit of analysis or factors that must be added to the models. 
Here, the concepts of knowledge, reason, power and too many related phenomena, such 
as representation, subjectification or objcetification are at issue. In many of these debates, 
although it is possible to outline what these critical writers are challenging, recapitulating 
their conclusions or their own alternatives is a relentless task. This is partially due to the 
postmodern affinity for ambiguity and partially to their resistance to closure. Critical 
approaches and postmodernism in particular are criticized as they do not produce a 
research agenda and do not proceed into everyday events from metatheoretical inquiry 
and perpetual criticism. However, the ‘positive value’ of the critical stances in the face of
“ Ken Booth, “Dare not to Know: International Relations Theory versus the Future”,p.3.30.
®K. J. Holsti, “International relations at the end of the millennium”. Review ofinternationol Relations 
Studies. Vol; 19 No:4 (October 1993), p/401.
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the modern discourses’ ability “to close down the discussion”'® and hence “limit the play 
of political practice"is praiseworthy.
Resistance to closure has significant normative connotations. First it enforces the 
mainstream positivist scholars to reconceptualize and reassert their stances by taking into 
account the marginalized voices. Secondly, it is commensurate to resisting the 
exclusionary or domination mechanisms. These normative underpinnings of the 
postmodern approaches are one of the traits that differentiate the present crisis from the 
previous one. To refer again to Holsti;
“The serious challenges today come not from those who want to add or subtract types of “essential” 
actors, or those who argue that not all of international politics can be cliaracterized as a “struggle for 
power”. The most serious onslauglit against the classical tradition comes from those who would 
change the core subjects of the field. This is essentially a normative rather than scientific 
question.”' “
Here we have to make a reservation to Holsti’s statement. This is a question that 
involves implications about the normative basis of science, more specifically the 
normativity of International Relations. The term ‘normative’ entails further explication 
because it is used in a different, or more appropriately, in a broader meaning than its 
conventional meanings. As the counterpart of the empirical or factual, ‘normative’, in its 
common sense, denotes prescriptive'®. By this dichotomization, what is descriptive or 
explanatory becomes empirical or factual. Through their assails on positivist/empiricist 
bias critical writers problematize this dichotomy and eschewal from so-called normative 
questions. Normative international relations theory gained an increasing visibility with 
the critical turn.
‘°Chris Brown, “International Relations Theory; New Normative Approaches”, p.226.
" Molly Cochran, “Postmodernism, Ethics and International Political Theory”, p.237.
'^K. J. Holsti, “The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Tlieory”, (Boston- 
London- Sydney: Allen& Unwin, 1985), p.2
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The first thing they achieved was to reveal that what is thought to be empirical is 
intermingled with putatively universal norms, standards and values. What is held to be 
objective is intersubjective. All these intersubjective values are socially constructed and 
mediated within an economy of intersubjective meanings. They are not implanted within 
a foundation or an essence, but all artifacts of the ‘life world’. This stance promotes 
democratic plurality both in practice and theory.
4.1.3. Theory as Practice
Through the transposition of the different understandings of knowledge, meaning and in
general theory, critical approaches that came to be known as post-positivist, enforce the
international relations scholars to think out what they are doing. “Theory as everyday
practice” that has been propagated particularly by postmodernists, is a real shock for the
ones that hold the conventional conception of “theory as a tool” '"'. This signifies the
inception of a long debate that has reached the watershed of an intellectual impasse.
“Academic conferences, and the resulting volumes, are often the places where insults get hurled 
both by those who oonsldci d:ciuscives, or are considered, to be primarily concerned with tlieory 
(we can call tliese tlie ‘tlieorists’) and tliose who regard tlieory as sometliing of a dubious, even self- 
indulgent, pursuit (we migltt refer to these as the ‘real worlders’). The ‘theorists’ regularly claim 
that the ‘real worlders’ don’t understand what theory is or how important it is. the ‘real worlders’ 
claim that ‘the theorists’ are stuck in their ivory towers and have little to say that can help us 
understand or do something about events such as the Holocaust, the Second World War or the 
contemporary war in the fonner Yugoslavia.”'^
Within the framework of this debate critical writers, particularly postmodernists 
are incriminated by their neglect of the ‘substantive events of the world affairs”. And 
incriminations culminated in the same rhetorical move. ‘Let’s leave aside these trivial 
issues of theory. Show me your research agenda!’ The idea behind these arguments is
See Cluis Brown, “Inlemational Relations Theory: New Nornialive Approaches”, pp. 1-4, for a brief 
account of the empirical nonnalive theory dichotomy.
See Marysia Zalcwski, “ ‘All Tliese Theories Yet the Bodies Keep Piling up’: Tlieories, Tlieorists, 
Theorising” in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), “International Tlicory: Positivism and 
Beyond”, (Cambridege: Cambridge University, 1996)
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ample; metatheoretical’ issues are superfluous and at best epiphenomenal. But no 
argument is forwarded as to why they are so, except the assumption of theory as a neutral 
tool in the hands of the theorists. What is advocated all through this thesis is a contrasting 
conception of “theory as everyday practice”'*^.
This conception of theory, as Marysia Zalewski has epitomised, has significant 
implications for the study of international relations. First it signifies that “the theorising 
that counts or that matters, in terms of affecting and/or creating international political 
events, is not confined either to policy makers or to academics”*’. Secondly, the 
distinction between theorists as niere observers and global actors as the real initiators of 
the world affairs became more and more problematic as “theorists are global actors and 
global actors are theorists”. Theorists who assume the distinguished tasks of teaching in 
the universities and speaking the truth to and/or guiding power find themselves reflected 
upon as exercising power. Questions posited by Theory as everyday practice’ or more 
precisely by the new focus on the power/knowledge nexus is rather different from the 
ongoing debates on the enigmatic relationship “between the two worlds of policy and 
academe”***. For the current debate does not presume two separate and interrelated 
worlds. The third implication of theory as practice unfolds into the unsettled terrain of 




'*CIirislopher Hill, “Academic International Relations: Tlie siren song of Policy Relevance” in Cliristopher 
Hill and Pamela Besboff, “Two Worlds of international Relations: academics. Practitioners and the Trade 
in Ideas”, (London-New York: Routledge,1994)p.20. Hill urges for the need to attain ones “academic 
comparative advantage and hence to distance oneself from the contemporary political issues to a level. See 
William Wallace, “Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and Practice in International 
Relations”, Review of International Studies, Vol:22 No:3 (July 1996), 301-21 for an opposite line of 
argument which was based on the same assumption or the separateness of the world of academe and policy 
but advocates a diflerent relationship between the two worlds.
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functions as a practice that attributes necessary salience to the issues that are theorised 
about. In other words what becomes important enough to be theorised about, is also 
determined through a complex process of theorising as a practice of power.
This line of argument has implications for various levels of theorizing and 
practice. Theory as practice constitutes one of the facets of the normative debates within 
the critical turn. It leads to a long series of perplexing questions about the role and 
responsibility of academicians, the right way to engage in politics etc. If every statement 
is based on a theory and every theory is molded by values, in short, if the claim to 
objectivity and the aim of reaching the ‘true’ knowledge is undermined and the political 
nature of the academic studies is acknowledged, on what grounds could the academic 
studies be justified as necessary and more importantly as useful? Even if we accept 
theory as practice, what would be the nature and direction of this practice? Should critical 
writers position themselves against the state in the name of leaving no space for power to 
hide and align themselves with marginal groups? What would be the impact of such an 
orientation in the context of developing non-Western countries where such marginal 
groups are far weaker and a different network of relations are at process? These questions 
are only exemplary of the wide range of problem areas that critical debates proceeded 
into or would be likely to proceed.
4.2. Widening and Deepening the Debate: A Different Responsibility to 
Educate
However, there is a limit to the celebratory mood. Although it would be unjust to claim 
that critical writers regress to a position of perpetual criticism, it is a fact that
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metatheoretical debates consume too much time before proceeding into the ones directly 
related to the every day life, affecting the lives of millions, and more visible and easy to 
comprehend than the theoretical issues. Another issue related to the first, is that the 
studies of critical writers, which are hardly easy to understand, can reach a narrow circle 
of audiences. Debates within the recent critical literature might seem as secret exchanges 
between professors written in a sacred language to most of the undergraduate students. 
When the alienness of the areas that they are adventuring on is taken into consideration, it 
becomes apparent why the too sophisticated and complex style of critical writers would 
easily intimidate a large number of students in the field and limit the extent of the 
audiences and the probable participants.
However, this is not totally due to the sophisticated and impenetrable jargon of 
the critical and especially that of the postmodernist writers. First of all, most students 
might be graduated from an undergraduate program in international relations without 
having any familiarity with the critical approaches. Although they gain increasing 
salience through the second half of the 1980s to this date, there might be a considerable 
resistance against the incorporation these approaches into the curricula. Professor Roy E. 
Jones provides us with an example of the typical response, laced with an extraordinary 
austerity. Jones in his review article “The Responsibility to Educate”*^ , beside criticizing 
R. B. J. Walker’s arguments in “Inside/ousted: International relations as Political 
Theory”, tries to answer questions such as “What is a discipline?”, “What does a 
discipline assume to do?”, and “Why must R. B. J. Walker and his companions not be 
taken seriously?”. The first pillar of his arguments is the idea of a discipline.
”  JONES, Roy E., “The Responsibility to Educate”, Review o f Internalional Studies, Vol;20 (1994), 
pp.299-311.
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“A discipline is not a subject. A discipline trains its pupils or apprentices to acquire skills applicable 
to recognized practical enterprises. They learn to do something so that they may go on doing it with 
greater expertise. ... Wliat can not be at issue is that it is a subject. And what it offers 
undergraduates is not a training but the beginning of an education.” “^
In Jones’ arguments it is not clear what he meant by training and education and what is
the supposed difference between the two. Further it is also not clear what should be the
aim of the international relations departments. Is it to educate qualified bureaucrats or
experts for ministries of foreign affairs or is it to raise academicians or both? But what is
clear from Roy Jones’ arguments is that he is an ardent advocate of an education that
prepares students for the ‘real life’ and he contends that this is not possible through
repetitive interpretation and reinterpretation of Machiavelli as Walker did. Thus Walker
is incriminated as eschewing the responsibility to educate.
“What of Professor Walker, the smug accuser? He is contemptuous of the institutions witliin which, 
somehow, the will to learn and to educate is strenuously kept alive. For him, tire learning is dogma 
and the education is indoctrination and liis is the endless duty to denounce both. He is the new man, 
the empty intellectual, the critical mind, the self-dramatizing hero of the margins, where education is 
devoid of responsibility and learning is playing with oilier people’s footnotes.”“'
Jones’ arguments in favor of an education preparing students to the ‘real life’ 
might seem uncontestable. However, the question tiiat is highlighted by Walker and his 
companions is mainly about the ‘real life’ that Jones dedicated himself to teach about. 
Real life is not the reality ‘out there’ any more that we can lecture about. It is a social 
reality that is socially constructed, mediated through intersubjective meanings and can be 
changed, that is filtered through our interpretation and can be re-interpreted. What Jones 
is missing is that his interpretation is only one of the interpretations among many 
probable alternatives. Offering his alternative as the only one, at least the only plausible 
item, Jones defies the idea of liberal education. Claiming to teach about ‘what is’, he 
totally ignores the intricate relationship between our ideas about ‘what is’ and ‘what
20 Ibid., p.300.
107
should be’ or 'what might be’. In other words, his revelation about the mysteries of the
'real life’ might turn out to be self-fulfilling prophecies.
“Real, critical self-reflection and post-positivist critiques will not take root until they are tauglit as 
part of the methodological sequence we require of all our graduate students and until they are 
reflected in the hiring practices of major research departments. It is not just in the writing and 
reading of international relations but in the teaching of international relations that these tendencies 
toward opemiess, tolerance, and post-positivist reflection must ultimately be manifested.
To epitomize, critical approaches must be incorporated into the international 
relations curricula for two reasons. First it is required by the ideal of liberal education. 
Second, to deepen the intimacy of the field to the wider debates within the social 
sciences. Nevertheless change in the curriculum would not suffice if it would be limited 
to a few additional elective courses about new approaches. Even if the critical approaches 
have been incorporated into the international relations curricula, it is unlikely that 
international relations undergraduate or probably even graduate students who know little 
or nothing about the political and social theory could understand these new approaches 
with easy. At this point Fred Halliday’s views are appreciated although his conclusions 
are and must be counterposed.
“Issues of methodology and pliilosophy of social science are central to the study of inteniational 
relations; they need to be handled on tlie basis of an adequate grounding in the general literature on 
the subject. Tliis should be a compulsory subject for all students of the international: this would 
provide IR students witli abroad social science culture but also diminish the danger of IR specialists 
wasting tlieir time, and that of others, witli mediocre reflections on methodology.”^^
We acknowledged the need for a deep change in the international relations 
curricula to open the gates of the discipline to critical approaches by procuring students 
with the essential and necessary background. Here Halliday’s proposal seems plausible as
ibid.,p.311.
Thomas J. Bierstcker, “Critical Reileclioiis on Post-Posilivism in International Relations”, InfernnfinnnI 
Studies Quarterly, Vol:33 No:3 (1989),p.265.
Fred Halliday, “The Future of International Relations; Fears and Hopes”, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and 
Marysia Zalewski (eds.), “International Tlieory: Pos-itivism and Beyond”, (Cambridege: Cambridge 
University, 1996)
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it acquiesced the need for deeper involvement in political and social theory. However, it 
is difficult to testify Halliday’s assertion that this is necessary for the purposes of 
preventing the waste of time “with mediocre reflections on methodology”. Because 
reflecting on methodology is not the first and foremost aim of the critical turn. There is 
more to these debates. As we have mentioned in the first chapter, critical approaches 
proceeded in multiple directions and at three different levels. All these have something to 
say about the theory and practice of the international relations. More significantly 
metatheoretical issues can not be resolved once and for all and in a way the results of 
which can be transferred to students through years once such a resolution is reached. In 
contrast to Halliday’s view these issues are not controversial only among international 
relations scholars because of their ignorance of the developments in the social 
philosophy. Instead, metatheoretical debates within the field as we have mentioned 
before is an integral part of the wider debates within the social sciences and critical turn 
in international relations is the harbinger of a rapprochement between the field and the 
other social sciences. Thus, incorporation of social and political theory into the 
international relations curricula would lead to a greater rapprochement between the field 
and the political and social theory and the recent debates within social philosophy that 
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